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The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Contracts
A. W. B. Simpsont
In his article, The HistoricalFoundationsof Modern Contract
Law,' subsequently republished and enlarged as a chapter in The
Transformation of American Law 1780-1860,2 Professor Morton J.
Horwitz advanced a striking new interpretation of the evolution of
American and English contract law in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This interpretation is related to his general thesis
about the "transformation" of American private law in the period
covered by the book. Horwitz claims that the private law of the
eighteenth century was benign, reflecting the assumptions of a "premarket economy,"' 3 and that its function was to impose a natural
and objectively just order upon society. By a variety of mechanisms
the law was then adapted to legitimate and facilitate the inequalities of the nineteenth-century market economy in which entrepreneurs flourished and the weak suffered.
I do not propose in this article to consider Horwitz's general
thesis, but rather its particular application to certain aspects of
contract law. Horwitz argues that there occurred a radical shift in
t Professor of Law, University of Kent at Canterbury and Visiting Professor of Law, The
University of Chicago, Spring, 1979. I should like to acknowledge the great assistance which
I have had in preparing this article from Professor John H. Langbein and Emile Karafiol.
Horwitz, The HistoricalFoundationsof Modem Contract Law, 87 HARv. L. Rav. 917
(1974).
2 The article appears as Chapter VI, "The Triumph of Contract," in M. Hoawrrz, THE
TANSFORMATION OF AMmuCAN LAw 161-210 (1977), with a paragraph, id. at 166 (lines 3-18),

and a long passage on "Custom and Contract," id. at 188-210, added. This article will not
dipcuss these additions.
3 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 930. See text and notes at notes 31-36 infra.
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contractual theory in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Before the change, the justification of contractual obligation
was sought in "the inherent justice or fairness of an exchange." 4
Eighteenth-century courts, concerned with justice, "limited and
sometimes denied contractual obligation" when the underlying exchange was unfair.5 They assumed that things had their proper
price: price, or value, did not depend solely on the operation of
market forces.6 This general philosophy found expression in what
Horwitz calls the "equitable conception of contract. ' 7 The eighteenth century also held to what Horwitz calls the "title theory of
exchange"-it understood contract primarily as a mechanism for
transferring property and not as a mechanism for securing expectations.'
Then, beginning in the last quarter of the eighteenth century,
the equitable approach to contract was replaced by the notion that
the source of contractual obligation was not the justice of the bargain but the convergence of the wills of the contracting parties.9
Horwitz elaborately develops a pessimistic interpretation of the
cases, presenting what might be regarded as minor changes in the
somewhat technical doctrines of contract law as fitting neatly into
a process that converted a more humane body of law into a weapon
of oppression. Once devised, the new scheme of contract law was
reinforced by that most ill-defined of legal ailments, formalism,10
which supposedly arose after 1825 or 1830, gathered momentum in
the 1840's and developed strongly after 1850.11
Underlying Horwitz's argument is a romanticized view of English law before the "transformation" and, indeed, before the eighteenth century. But the heart of his argument lies in his view that
eighteenth-century contract law reflected an equitable conception
or theory of contract, which was "essentially antagonistic to the
interests of commercial classes, ' 12 and that this conception was replaced by an approach more congenial to the needs of a commercial,
market economy. As Horwitz presents it, this argument is hard to
4 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 917.
5 Id. at 923.
£ Id. at 926-27.
Id. at 919.
Id. at 920-21, 923. Horwitz does not discuss in detail the doctrine that a contract for
the sale of specific goods passes property to the buyer before delivery, a doctrine which of
course survives.
Id. at 917-18.
" M. Hoawrrz, supra note 2, at 201, 253-66.
" See id. at 254, 256, 258-59.
i Horwitz, supra note 1, at 927.
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test against the evidence-partly because it is so general and partly
because Horwitz, with true rhetorical mastery, interweaves evidence from England and America, from different periods of time,
and from different types of cases. His argument does, however, rest
upon a number of specific propositions that can be related to evidence.' 3 In his view, eighteenth-century courts (1) did not fully recognize the executory contract;' 4 (2) did not award expectation damages;' 5 (3) accepted inadequacy of consideration as a well established ground for refusing a decree of specific performance;' 6 (4)
accepted a "substantive doctrine of consideration" whereby juries
in contract cases were to reduce damages where consideration was
inadequate; 7 (5) implied a warranty of quality where the price was
at least the normal price charged for the goods;18 and (6) allowed the
joining of counts in express and implied contract.'9 Horwitz argues
that each of these positions was abandoned in the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries.
I will address the general issue of Horwitz's view of pre"transformation" English law in the first part of this article. In the
second and major section of the article, I will try to demonstrate,
by a detailed investigation of Horwitz's sources, that the evidence
he adduces for the specific propositions underlying his thesis is very
weak. Horwitz also supports his argument by analyzing treatises on
contracts published in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The third part of the article will consider that body of evidence. I will conclude with some suggestions regarding the general
interpretation of the evolution of contract law in this period.
I.

THE

GOOD OLD LAw

Horwitz supports his thesis that, starting in the late eighteenth
century, the law of contract was transformed into an instrument of
class oppression, with a romanticized view of earlier English law and
society. This support is not logically necessary to his thesis. A Marxist might have argued that the English commercial bourgeoisie,
11This list is not exhaustive, but it contains the most important propositions into which
Horwitz's thesis about the equitable conception of contract can be analyzed.
14Horwitz, supra note 1, at 919-20, 929-31, 936. Horwitz does not state categorically that
executory contracts were never recognized, but that they were rarely enforced, or that there
were no rules tQ cope with them. He does state that in some jurisdictions in the eighteenth
century executory contracts were not enforced without part performance. See id. at 929-30.
Id. at 936-37.
" Id. at 923-24.

Id. at 924.
Id. at 926-27.
' Id. at 934-35.
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linked with elements in the landed classes, forged an equitable
theory of contract in the eighteenth century as a weapon in their
struggle with a law reflecting earlier, less commercial times; and
that once it triumphed, the new order cut back on the dangerous
legal doctrines it had used against the old. But this is emphatically
not Horwitz's position. His view of the history of English and American law appears to be linear, not dialectical. He presents the benign
and equitable elements in eighteenth-century contractual theory
not as innovations associated with the growth of commercial (preindustrial) capitalism, but as the approach to contract that is appropriate to a precommercial society.
Horwitz suggests in various ways that eighteenth-century English law and society were closer to a simple and morally pure earlier
state than to the rapacious world of the nineteenth century. One
problem with these suggestions is that the image projected of that
earlier state is often skewed. For example, by using expressions like
"the medieval tradition of substantive justice,"2 0 "theories of objective value and just price,",2,"this remnant of the medieval just price
theory of value, '22 Horwitz relates his eighteenth-century equitable
theory of contract to medieval and presumably postmedieval doctrines associated with notions of just price. Unfortunately, Horwitz
tends here to perpetuate a myth that scholars have long attempted
to put to rest.? His rather vague references should be received with
some caution if they are intended to suggest that there was a single
doctrine that was generally accepted by medieval or postmedieval
secular tribunals dealing with contract law, and that this doctrine
was hostile to competitive markets.
The idea of a just price goes back in Christian thought at least
to St. Augustine of Hippo. 24 From Aquinas onward, the Christian
moralists, responding to the rapid growth of commerce in the high
Middle Ages, argued in favor of high ethical standards in bargain2

Id. at 917.

21 Id. at 946.

1 Id. at 935. See also id. at 946 n.153.
See generally 1 W. ASHLEY, ECONOrmC HISTORY AND THEORY 132-48 (1931); G. O'BRIEN,
AN ESSAY ON MEDIAEVAL ECONOhIC TEACHING 102-36 (1920); THE JUST PRICE (V. Demant ed.
1930); de Roover, The Concept of the Just Price: Theory and Economic Policy, 18 J. Econ.
Hist. 418 (1958). See also de Roover, Monopoly Theory Priorto Adam Smith: A Revision, 65
Q.J.'EcoN. 492 (1951), reprinted in R. DE ROOVER, BUSINESS, BANKING AND ECONOMIC THOUGHT
IN LATE MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN EUROPE 273, 277-78, 290 (J. Kirshner ed. 1974). For an
2

appraisal of de Roover's views on scholastic price theory, see Kirshner, Raymond de Roover

on Scholastic Economic Thought, in id. at 15, 22-26.
21 St. Augustine used the expression justum pretium in DE TRINITATE XIII. 3. It is also
found in the CORPUS IUlm, COD. 4, 44, 2, but its meaning there is problematic.
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ing. They rejected as sinful all forms of fraud, trickery, and evasion, and all exploitation of the particular weakness of individuals.
With this approach, they developed and elaborated notions of the
just price of commodities at which commerce could take place without sin. The prevailing view came to be that the just price is fixed
by common estimation (communis aestimatio)in a fairly conducted
market-in the absence of fraud, monopoly, or coercion; value as set
by the community was contrasted with special value to the individual. 2 The monopolist, not the market, was seen as the great enemy
of the just price. Consequently, in the absence of a fairly conducted
market, or when unusually poor conditions of supply or unusually
heavy demand threatened to imbalance the market, the just price
was to be imposed by legal regulation. It was common enough for
prices to be determined that way in medieval and early modern
times, but given normal conditions, the fair or just price was the
market price, or the price set by ordinary supply and demand.
The civilians, in contrast, based themselves primarily on texts
in the Digest and in particular on opinions of Paul, Ulpian, and
Pomponius, which did not speak of just price, but recognized that
contracting parties could lawfully outwit each other over the price. 7
A limited exception to this principle, derived from rescripts of the
emperors Diocletian and Maximinian in the Codex, 21 allowed a sale
to be set aside if the price was less than half a true (verum) or proper
(iustum) price. This rule of laesio enormis, formulated in a variety
of ways by different authors, 29 came generally to be restricted to
" See generally 1 W..ASHLEY, supra note 23, at 132-48; R.
277 n.1 (correcting Ashley).

DE ROOVER,

supra note 23, at

21 It was in this sense that the just price was "objective." It was conceded that there was
a degree of latitude in the just price: Aquinas put it that "the just price of things is not fixed

with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of estimate, so that a slight addition or

subtraction would not seem to destroy the equality of justice." T. AQuINAs, SuMMA
pt. 2, Q. 77, art. 1, at 320 (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans.
1929). See note 23 supra, especially the works of de Roover and Kirshner cited therein.
When discussing the "market price," one needs to bear in mind that strictly speaking
there is a distinction between the modem economist's abstract sense of "the market" and
the older, more literal sense of a place where buying and selling regularly and lawfully goes
on. In the older sense there is, for example, no market price for land; land is not sold in the
market. But although-there is no "market" for rooms in an inn, the just price for such a room
need not be imposed by regulation. It is the price charged ordinarily, absent sudden surges
in demand such as would occur with the unexpected arrival of a group of pilgrims.
THEOLOGICA

2 DIGEST 4.4.16.4, 19.2.22.3. These texts need to be read in the context of the Roman
rules regarding defects of quality and the general obligation to act with good faith.
28 COD. 4, 44, 2 and 4, 44, 8 (Rescript of 285 A.D.). Some scholars have suspected that

the language in question was interpolated by the compilers.
21 Domat, for example, states the position as follows:
There are some commodities, of which the price may be regulated for the public good;

The University of Chicago Law Review

[46:533

sales of immovables.
The extent to which secular courts in medieval or postmedieval
Europe acted upon the views of either the theologians or the civilians raises complex questions on which I am not competent to pronounce. In English common law there is, so far as I am aware, no
evidence for the general reception of either.30 The point I wish to
stress here is that neither civilians nor Christian moralists, both
trying to adapt received notions to the needs of a society with growing commercial activity, were hostile in principle to a functioning
market as a price-setter.
V
Throughout his analysis, Horwitz implies that eighteenthcentury contract law reflected the values of a society whose economy
was not only preindustrial in the sense that it had not yet been
transformed by the "industrial revolution," but one that was simple, agrarian, and in some sense "pre-market," '3' and which therefore bred values that were "pre-commercial, ' ' 32 or at least "antagonistic to the interests of commercial classes. '33 While Horwitz applies

these terms to America more than to England,34 and his sparse
evidence comes from America as much as from England, 35 it is in

as it is, for example, in bread, and other things, in some countries. But setting aside
these regulations, the price of things is undetermined. And since it ought to be differently regulated according to the different qualities of the things, and according to the
plenty and scarcity both of money and of the commodities, the easiness or difficulty of
the carriage, and other causes which increase or diminish the value; this uncertainty of
price makes an extent of more and of less, which requires that the seller and buyer should
adjust between themselves the price of the sale.
1 J. DOMAT, THE CIvIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER 217 (3d ed. W. Strahan trans. Boston
1850) (1st ed. London 1722) (translation of LES LOIS CIVILES DANS LEnr ORDRE NATUREL (Paris
1694)). Domat also states the doctrine of laesio enormis in the case of immovables. Id. at 228.
30With respect to equity, see text and notes at notes 151-187 infra; for the common law,
see text and notes at notes 44-47 infra.
31 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 930. The term is here applied to the economy of colonial
America, but Horwitz makes the same point more emphatically for England in the introduction to his article, where he states that "Powell's argument [as proposed in 1790] against
conceptions of intrinsic value and just price reflects major changes in thought associated with
the emergence of a market economy." Id. at 918. In other words, until the second half of the
eighteenth century, England did not enjoy (or suffer from) a "market economy." Horwitz
follows the sentence just quoted with another that appears to support it, but in fact states a
much more limited, and much less relevant claim: "It appears that it was only during the
second half of the eighteenth century that national commodities markets began to develop
in England." Id. (emphasis added). See text at notes 39-40 infra.
32M. HORWITZ, supra note 2, at 211 (referring to "a still dominant precommercial consciousness of rural and religious America").
31Horwitz, supra note 1, at 927 (referring to both England and America).
See notes 31-33 supra.
5 For example, Horwitz supports the statement quoted in note 31 supra, about the late
emergence of a "market economy," with the point that "[i]n America, widespread markets
in government securities arose shortly after'the Revolutionary War"' Horwitz, supra note 1,
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England that the Chancellor and courts supposedly developed the
equitable conception of contract. Thus, if the image of economic
backwardness he presents is relevant to eighteenth-century AngloAmerican contract law, it must be applicable to eighteenth-century
English society.
Although there is room for judgment here, the suggestion that
English law reflected a relatively simple and primitive3 economy is
odd in a work dealing with the law as it was pronounced by the
King's Chancellor and the King's courts in London, not as it was
spoken in small borough courts and village tribunals. England,
even in the first half of the eighteenth century, was the greatest trading nation in the world, and its trade was supported by a
sophisticated mercantile community well versed in techniques of
shipping, financing, and insuring cargoes around the world.3
Equally important, England was second to none in the skill and
depth of its commercial and industrial infrastructure. Horwitz emphasizes that a national commodities market grew up in England
only in the second half of the eighteenth century. 3 This is debatable, 39 and not very relevant. Important regional markets affected
a large part of the population no later than the beginning of the
century; 0 just feeding and supplying London oriented much of the
at 918. He says nothing about England's securities markets here, but at his cross-reference
at 937, he points out that "Lord Mansfield in 1770 referred to a speculative interest in stock
as 'a new species of property, arisen within a compass of a few years.'" Id. at 937 (quoting
Nightingal v. Devisme, 5 Burr. 2589, 2592, 98 Eng. Rep. 361, 363 (K.B. 1770)). Whatever Lord
Mansfield may have been referring to, speculation in paper was common in England in the
first half of the eighteenth century, when the equitable conception of contract was supposedly
ascendant and not seriously challenged. The celebrated affair of the South Sea Bubble (1720)
arose out of a national orgy of such speculation.
The word "primitive" may be thought too strong, but it is difficult to know how else
to characterize an economy in which, according to Horwitz, goods were not yet "thought of
as fungible," Horwitz, supra note 1, at 918.
3 See generally T. ASHTON, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ENGLAND: THE 18TH CENTURY
(1955). On the sophisticated character of England's economy even before the eighteenth
century, see J. CHARTm, INTERNAL TRADE IN ENGLAND 1500-1700 (1977); Deane, The Industrial Revolution in Great Britain, in 4 THE FONTANA ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE (THE
EMERGENCE OF INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES (pt. 1)) 161, 172-74 (C. Cipolla ed. 1973).
14 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 918. See note 31 supra.
39 See Granger &.Elliott, A Fresh Look at Wheat Pricesand Markets in the Eighteenth
Century, 20 ECON. HIsT. REv. (2d ser.) 256 (1967); 1 E. HOBSBAWM, INDUSTRY AND EmPIRE. THE
MAKING OF MODERN ENGLISH SOCIETY, 1750 To THE PRESENT DAY 24 (1968) (England in the
eighteenth century before the industrial revolution "was not merely a market economy-i.e.,
one in which the bulk of goods and services outside the family are bought and sold-but in
many respects it formed a single national market.").
40 Horwitz's claim that until the development of a national commodities market the price
of grain was "local," not "regional," Horwitz, supra note 1, at 918 (quoting K. POLANUX, THE
GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 115 (Beacon Press
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country towards producing for a market. This is not to deny that
there were regions, and sections of the population, relatively distant
from the world of finance, commerce, and industry. But Horwitz's
apparent premise that there must be a national market embracing
almost everyone in society before the groups that shape the law can
be influenced profoundly by commercial interests and needs is unsupportable. Again, I would not deny that the English aristocracy
and gentry sometimes affected to despise commercial values in the
eighteenth century (though perhaps no more than in the nineteenth). But to suggest that the law pronounced in Chancery and
the common-law courts could ignore the needs of the commercial
classes and their powerful allies in Parliament and the court reveals
a profound misunderstanding of English politics and society in the
eighteenth century and, for that matter, in the seventeenth as well.
These examples can be multiplied. In the second section of this
article I will point out that Horwitz sometimes appears to misstate
earlier English law in his attempt to show that it was only in the
late eighteenth century that the courts and the treatise writers
began to transform this law to meet what he conceives to be the
needs of a commercial society. I want to close the present section,
however, with a more general point. If the eighteenth-century law,
in sharp contrast to what was to succeed it, was anticommercial and
reflected, as Horwitz puts it, "the medieval tradition of substantive
justice," 4 we might expect that the pre-eighteenth-century common
law of contract, and particularly the medieval law, would be even
more benign and protective. Yet it is quite clear that this was not
the case.
The typical medieval contract was the formal contract, the
penal bond under seal; the harsh medieval law of the penal bond
was notoriously based on the philosophy that those who made beds
should lie in them. 2 The law emphatically favored creditors over
debtors, and despite the received objections to usury, the law rigorously enforced the recovery of penalties.4 3 So far as informal contracts are concerned (the point is palpable for contracts under seal),
ed. 1957)), is misleading if it is meant to imply-as it apparently does-that there were no
regional markets in England until the second half of the eighteenth century. See Granger &
Elliott, supra note 39.
" Horwitz, supra note 1, at 917.
2

On the earlier law of contract, see generally A.

SIMPSON,

A

HISTORY OF THE COMMON

LAW OF CoNTRAcr 88-126 (1975) (substantially incorporating Simpson, The Penal Bond with
ConditionalDefeasance, 82 L.Q. Rav. 392 (1966)).
A. SIMPSON, supra note 42, at 113-15.

1979]

Horwitz and the History of Contracts

there is not to be found a single hint in the case law of the fifteenth,
sixteenth, or seventeenth centuries of the acceptance of a doctrine
of just price." Scholars may attempt to explain away Chandelorv.
Lopus" (1603), but it is more important to notice the complete
absence of any suggestions in the case law of implied warranties of
quality between 1603 and the late eighteenth century, with the possible exception of contracts for victuals" and the very scanty evidence of a different attitude in late medieval common law. 7
Throughout this period, and long after, imprisonment without
term was the fate of the debtor who failed to deliver." As Edmund
Plowden put it in 1551, with a certain lack of charm:
For if one be in Execution he ought to live of his own, and
neither the Plaintiff nor the Sheriff is bound to give him Meat
or Drink, no more than if one distrains Cattle, and puts them
in a Pound . .

.

. [A]nd if he has no Goods, he shall live of

the Charity of others, and if others will give him nothing, let
him die in the Name of God, if he will, and impute the Cause
of it to his own Fault, for his Presumption and ill Behaviour
brought him to that Imprisonment.4'
So spoke the greatest common lawyer of the time, a devout
adherent of the old religion and a man who was offered the office of
Chancellor by Elizabeth I. It is true that Chancery did, to a considerable extent, soften the extreme rigors of the common law's enthusiasm for creditors' rights-for example, by relieving against penalties, though this jurisdiction was established only in the seventeenth
century. If, instead of selecting a short period of the eighteenth
century for comparison with the nineteenth, one takes in the medieval common law as a basis for comparison, the picture of a loss of
primeval innocence appears most implausible.
Horwitz's thesis does not stand or fall on this issue, of course.
Whether he is right in his views about earlier English law, the char" Id., at 445-52. Horwitz, supra note 1, at 948-49, juxtaposes two passages from G.
VERPLANCK, AN ESSAY ON THE DoCTRmE OF CoNTRAcrs 96, 104 (New York 1825), critical of justprice doctrine, as if they were directed at the received wisdom in the common-law world. They
were not. The first comes from a chapter dealing only with "[tihe doctrines of the Cwvm LAW,
and of the modem systems founded on it," id. at 59, while the second refers specifically to
the "doctrines" of the "Civil Code" of Rome, id. at 103-04.
,5Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3 (Exch. Ch. 1603), noted in 8 HIARV. L. REv. 282 (1894),
discussed in A. SIMPSON, supra note 42, at 412 n.1, 536 & n.2.
' A. SIMPSON, supra note 42, at 536-37. See 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *165.
4 A. SIMPSON, supra note 42, at 240-47.
" Id. at 587-93.
4'Dive v. Maningham, 1 Plowd. 60, 68 (C.P. 1550), reprinted with slight variations in
75 Eng. Rep. 96, 108-09.
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acter of English society before and during the eighteenth century,
or the incompatibility of equitable doctrines of contract with the
needs of entrepreneurs in an industrial society is ultimately of secondary importance. I will now turn, therefore, to a consideration of
the evidence for his view that contract law was fundamentally different in the eighteenth century from what it became in the nineteenth because the eighteenth century accepted an equitable conception of contract that conceived of contract in terms of a "title
theory of exchange" and looked to the fairness of an exchange before
it would enforce its terms.

II. THE EqurrABLE CONCEPTION OF CoNTRACT
Horwitz's thesis about the transformation of English and American contract law in the period 1780-1860o0 rests essentially on his
interpretation of eighteenth-century English contract law before the
transformation. It is my view that the differences Horwitz claims to
have discovered between eighteenth-century and early nineteenthcentury contract law are, for the most part, illusory. I am not saying
that the law did not change in this period, but that the changes he
describes were not the changes that occurred. In particular, many
of the doctrines that he identifies as characteristic of the transformation were common in the eighteenth century.
I realize that any major change in the law does not happen
overnight. It would not be very significant to find occasional cases
in the eighteenth century stating what allegedly became law only
in the nineteenth. I have not, therefore, focused on cases that Horwitz ignores, though they are noted where necessary. Rather, the
focus of the following analysis is the evidence that Horwitz himself
adduces in support of his thesis. Again, to show that his interpretation of the evidence is occasionally at fault would not be very significant, since this would not affect his general thesis. My contention
is that Horwitz allowed himself to be misled by his striking and
seductive thesis into a general and systematic misinterpretation of
the evidence, and that his thesis, once tested in detail, is quite
misconceived. In order to make the case for this view it is essential,
if at times tedious, to subject his arguments to very close inspection.
I The dates are from the title of his book. In the main, his discussion of contract locates
the change in the period 1790-1844, the precise dates corresponding with the publication of
Powell's and Story's treatises on contract law. 1 & 2 J. POWELL, ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF
CONTRACrS AND AGREEMENTS (Dublin 1790); W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS

NoT UNDER SEAL (Boston 1844).
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I can see no other way of testing the validity of a thesis that, if
correct, is of great historical importance.
A.

The Recognition of Executory Contracts

Horwitz writes that "contrary to the orthodox view, the process
[whereby the executory exchange became enforceable] was not
complete at the end of the sixteenth century. . . .[A]s late as the
eighteenth century contract law was still dominated by a title
theory of exchange."'5 It is difficult to come to grips with this position. What does it mean to say that the process "was not complete"?
No one has claimed that the executory contract played precisely the
same role in the sixteenth century as in the eighteenth, or as in the
twentieth. In that sense, no process of institutional development is
complete until that institution is dead. Similarly, nobody has
claimed that the conception of contract as a set of mutual promises
drove all other conceptions of contract out of the field in the sixteenth century-it has not done so even today. The issue is, or
should be, whether the exchange of promises was a recognized, standard way for parties to conclude a mutually enforceable agreement
in the eighteenth century. That the place of executory contracts in
early modem English law was different from what it is today does
not mean that the law did not fully recognize such contracts. I have
set out elsewhere a detailed explanation of the processes whereby socalled executory contracts came to be recognized and, perhaps more
important, an analysis of what this expression means, 52 but a short
summary here may clarify what Horwitz has misunderstood.
It was settled in the sixteenth century that mutual promises
could be consideration for each other. In such a case, a plaintiff
could sue for breach without averring performance, the other party
being put to his counter-action. The doctrine originated with wagers, where it is logically necessary. 4 Not all exchanges of promises,
however, were analyzed as bilateral, executory contracts in the modern sense-as promise-for-promise cases. It might be the intention
of the parties that the consideration should be the performance, not
the promise. In such a case, the plaintiff had to show performance
before he could -sue: the promise itself was not actionable because
if performance had not yet occurred, there was not yet considera-,Horwitz, supra note 1, at 920.
52

A.

"

Id. at 459-70.
The first case is West v. Stowel, 2 Leo. 154, 74 Eng. Rep. 437 (C.P. -1577).

SIMPSON,

supra note 42, at 452-70. See generally id. at 406-88.
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tion.15 An alternative conceptual scheme for achieving the same

practical result employed the concept of a condition: the defendant's promised performance might be conditional upon prior or
simultaneous performance by the plaintiff, so that the plaintiff
would lose unless he could show performance or tender. 6
Very elaborate rules evolved for these situations. They offered
a guide to whether the parties intended to treat a counter-promise
or only its performance as consideration and, using the concept of
conditional obligation, dealt with the mutual dependence or independence of promises. 57 Their application caused endless difficulty.58 The existence of these rules does not mean, however, that

contemporaries were "confused" about the nature of contract, and
it does not contradict the proposition that the law recognized pure
promise-for-promise contracts. Rather, these rules were an integral
part of the promise-for-promise doctrine. One can understand what
was meant by an executory contract in this period only by keeping
in mind the existence of these rules, for they defined the limits of
the pure promise-for-promise contract and set forth other ways in
which a promise might become the source of a future binding obligation.
Finally, it must be noted that the voluminous case law on the
subject, from the mid-sixteenth century until the nineteenth, is
primarily concerned with establishing when a plaintiff can sue,
rather than when a person may unilaterally withdraw from a promise before breach.5 9 In the earliest cases in which the latter issue was
aired, it was regarded-however surprising we may find this-as a
A. SIMPSON, supra note 42, at 459-70.
Id. at 102.
"
These rules are associated with the leading cases of Pordage v. Cole, 1 Wins. Saund.
319, 85 Eng. Rep. 449 (K.B. 1669), and Cutter v. Powell, 6 T.R. 320, 101 Eng. Rep. 573 (K.B.
1795).
" For statements about the period of the "transformation," see J, CHrrrY, A PRAcTIcAL
TRFATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTs, NOT UNDER SEAL 273-74 (London 1826); 1 W. SELWYN,
AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW OF Nisi Pasus 102-09 (3d ed. London 1812) (1st ed. London 1806);
W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNRACTs NOT UNDER SAL
18, at 11,
26-33, at
19-25 (2d ed. Boston 1847) (1st ed. Boston 1844). The rules tended to be regarded as pleading
rules, rather than substantive principles of contract law. As Selwyn points out, "[tjhe
principal difficulty in the construction of agreements consists in discovering, whether the
consideration be a condition precedent, a concurrent act, or a mutual promise." W. SELWYN,
supra, at 109. The effect of these rules was that it was most unusual for a plaintiff to be able
to sue for breach without showing performance or tender. But this is the situation today as
well; it does not mean that the law of contract was abandoned the executory contract. The
evidence is discussed in W. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW 56-59 (1975).
" For the doctrine of "countermand," see A. SIMPSON, supra note 42, at 466-70. The
notion seems to disappear silently. It revives in a new form with Cooke v. Oxley, 3 T.R. 653,
100 Eng. Rep. 785 (K.B. 1790).
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distinct issue. Eventually, by a process still not understood, it was
settled that the giving of a consideration for a promise, whether that
consideration was an act or a counter-promise, made the promise
binding. When the doctrine of offer and acceptance entered in the
nineteenth century, it expressed this view."0
In support of his thesis that the recognition of executory contracts came late, Horwitz develops an argument that involves a
contrast between what he calls the "title theory of exchange" and
the recognition of executory contracts." If I understand the argument, it is that under the former theory contracts are viewed primarily as a form of conveyance of property rather than as arrangements binding the parties to future performance. This conception
certainly did exist, and it has a long history. 2 It is still useful today
to treat contracts as a type of conveyance; thus the sale of goods is
still in English law said to pass "property" in certain circumstances
to the buyer." Furthermore, in a more general sense a contractual
right can be viewed as a form of property right being created by the
contractual transaction.
Horwitz relies primarily on a reading of Blackstone to support
his statement that the title theory dominated the eighteenthcentury view of contract and his implication that this excluded the
alternative conception of contracts as arrangements binding the
parties to future performance. He stresses that "[iun Blackstone's
Commentaries contract appears for the first time in Book II, which
is devoted entirely to the law of property . . . and for the second
and last time in a chapter entitled, 'Of Injuries to Personal Property.' "64 But Horwitz has exaggerated and misunderstood the significance of this arrangement.
The main problem faced by any treatise writer is organization,
and once a scheme is presented in a successful work, others tend to
follow it. In Matthew Hale's The Analysis of the Law,6 , written in
the seventeenth century but first published in 1713, contract law
was somewhat unhappily accommodated twice: first in the basic
category of "Rights" and second in the basic category of "Wrongs." 6
See generally Simpson, Innovation in Nineteenth Century ContractLaw, 91 L.Q. REv.
247 (1975).
" See text at note 50 supra.
,, See A. SIMPSON, supra note 42, at 185-93.
U See generally P. ATIYAH, THE SALE OF GOODS 141-45 (5th ed. 1975); 2 CHrrry ON
CONTACTS §§ 4490-4510 (A. Guest gen. ed. 24th ed. 1977).
' Horwitz, supra note 1, at 920 (footnote omitted).
'5 M. HALE, THE ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (London 1713) (published posthumously).
Id. at 79-80, 120-23.
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Blackstone, with only slight modifications, followed this arrangement.6 7 In relation to "Rights," contracts are a mode of transferring
property, the right either to a thing in possession or to a thing in
action-and that is how Blackstone treats contract in Book II.6 8 In
relation to "Wrongs," a contract is viewed as an agreement for the
future, and failure to perform is an actionable wrong-and that is
how Blackstone treats it in the discussion of private wrongs to personal property in Book MJ.9 Blackstone, in short, deals with contract both ways, and he does so not because he is reflecting some
prevailing theory of eighteenth-century law, but for the mundane
reason that he is faithfully following Hale's scheme of organization,
the best one he knew. It is a mistake to attach too much significance
to the form in which Blackstone presents contract in Book ]I at the
expense of neglecting the presentation in Book I. An understandable plagiarism, not high contractual theory, explains Blackstone's
treatment of contract.
Horwitz also supports his thesis with the argument, limited to
America, that American courts did not enforce executory contracts
unless there had been at least part performance. 0 His somewhat
sparse evidence for this statement is not convincing. The doctrine
he reports7 1 from John Adams's Commonplace Book 72 concerns
promise-for-act agreements, in which performance 'Was in standard
doctrine a prerequisite of obligation.73 Orthodox law is also set out
in Zephaniah Swift's A System of the Laws of the State of
Connecticut.74 Swift, whom Horwitz portrays as wavering between
recognition and nonrecognition of executory contracts, 75 merely
,1 Similarly, Blackstone employs Hale's distinction between express and implicit contracts. Compare 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARiES *153 with M. HALE, supra note 65, at 121.
2 W. BLACKSTONE, CoMmErrARIEs *40-70.
3 id. at *153-66.
70 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 929-31. Horwitz's third argument for his thesis regarding
executory contracts, which links the recognition of such contracts with the award of expectation damages, see id. at 936, will be discussed in the following section.
7' Id. at 930. See note 73 infra.
72 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 4 (L. Wroth & H. Zobel eds. 1965).
13 The full text makes this quite clear: "In executory Agreements, if the Contract be, that
one shall do an Act, and for the doing thereof, the other shall pay &c. the Performance of
the Act is a Condition preecedent [sic] to the Payment. Except 1, a Day appointed for
Payment of the Money happen before the Thing can be performed. For in this case it is plain
the Party relied upon his Remedy." Id. at 4-5. Adams states the rule with respect to mutually
independent promises quite clearly in a passage Horwitz does not quote: "In Case of mutual
Promises, one Promise is the Consideration of the other. And in these Cases the Plaintiff is
not obliged to aver Performance of his Part." Id. at 20.
"1 1 Z. SwIFr, A SYSTEM OF THE LAws OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 380-81 (Windham
1795).
1 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 930.
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states what had long been the law and long would be. So far as
promise-for-promise cases are concerned, Swift explains that mutual promises can be consideration for each other, but only if the
parties so intended. 6 Whether the parties contracted on the basis
of mutual promises or on the basis that part performance was required for any obligation to arise is a question of inference from the
facts. Swift also explains the mutual dependence rules and gives a
particularly clear account of how such rules worked in the law of
sale.77
Finally, it is difficult for me to comment on Horwitz's use of
Muir v. Key7" (Virginia 1787) because I have not had access to the
manuscript in which the case is reported. From Horwitz's account
of the dispute in the case, the issue apparently turned on the application of the rules on mutual dependence of promises. Here, as with
Swift, I must again emphasize that it was only because of the recognition of promise-for-promise contracts that all the complex rules of
mutual dependence became necessary. Horwitz fails to appreciate
the complexity and the function of the rules governing bilateral
contracts, which had been settled in all essentials in the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries.
B.

The Award of Expectation Damages

Horwitz places considerable emphasis on the alleged failure of
the courts in the eighteenth century to award "expectation damages." He argues that the law first adopted the expectation principle
in the 1790s, in cases involving speculative dealings in stock. The
principle then passed into the law of sales and presumably elsewhere. Horwitz links the refusal to award expectation damages before the 1790s to his "title theory of exchange," and the adoption of
the new principle to the alleged rise of the executory contract and
the beginning of the separation of contract and property law:
[TIhe recognition of expectation damages marks the rise of
the executory contract as an important part of English and
American law. Furthermore, the moment at which courts focus
on expectation damages, rather than restitution or specific performance to give a remedy for non-delivery, is precisely the
7, 1 Z. SwiFr, supra note 74, at 375-76 (citing Nichols v. Raynbred, Hob. 88, 80 Eng. Rep.
238 (K.B. 1615)), 380.
Id. at 375.
7 This was cited by Horwitz, supra note 1, at 929-30, 929 n.64 (ms. in Tucker-Coleman
Collection, Swen Library, College of William & Mary).
"' Horwitz, supra note 1, at 937.
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time at which contract law begins to separate itself from prop80
erty.
It is somewhat surprising that Horwitz contrasts specific performance and expectation damages as if they embodied antithetical
policies or theories. The idea of distinguishing, for analytical purposes, damages awarded on an "expectation" basis stems from the
celebrated article by Fuller and Perdue in 1936.1 Fuller and Perdue
distinguish a restitution interest, a reliance interest, and an expectation interest. There are two ways to protect the expectation interest: award damages calculated as being the value of performance,
or award specific performance. 2 Insofar as the Court of Chancery
awarded specific performance long before 1790, it was not giving
expectation damages, but it was vindicating the expectation interest.
When Powell wrote in 1790 that specific performance would be
given for a contract to deliver stock, he was recognizing the expectation principle, not adopting some antithetical principle as Horwitz
appears to claim.13 Indeed, the passage that Horwitz cites in Powell,
which reproduced the decision in Thomson v. Harcourt84 (1722), is
a strong example of recognition of the expectation principle. The
defendant had refused to accept delivery of stock in a falling market. Although the court held that the contract was rendered parId. at 936-37.
Fuller & Perdue, The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages (pts. 1 & 2), 46 YALE L.J.
52, 373 (1936-1937).
m2 Id. at 54. In passing, two points are worth noting. First, much of the nineteenthcentury case law on the assessment and measure of damages centered upon the scope of the
expectation principle, or, how generously performance was to be valued. Second, the scheme
of thought in which problems were presented (for example, whether loss of profits should be
awarded) was not that of Fuller and Perdue. Contemporaries had no opportunity to read that
justly famous contribution to the subject; they did not analyze problems in terms of
"interests." Their basic scheme of thought was causal: did the breach cause the loss for which
the damages were claimed?
4 Horwitz writes that "as late as 1790, John Powell concluded that specific performance,
and not an action for damages, was the proper remedy for failure to deliver stock in a rising
market." Horwitz, supra note 1, at 937 (citing 2 J. POWELL, supra note 50, at 232-33). In the
passages just before and just after the one cited, Powell discusses circumstances under which
"the plaintiff ought to be left to make the most of it he can at law, and not aided by a court
of equity." Id. at 232. He contrasts these with the case of a failure to deliver stock, in which
specific performance was normally granted. Although the plaintiff in the case to which Powell
refers was enjoined from pursuing his remedy at law, Thomson v. Harcourt, 1 Brown 193, 198,
1 Eng. Rep. 508, 512 (H.L. 1722), Powell nowhere says that specific performance was the
exclusive remedy allowed in such cases. In practice, in a rising market plaintiffs would
normally prefer specific performance to damages measured as of the date on which delivery
had been due. Thomson v. Harcourt concerned failure to accept delivery in a falling market.
$ 1 Brown 193, 1 Eng. Rep. 508 (H.L. 1722). See text at notes 166-168 infra.
"
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tially void by statute, it also held that the defendant had to accept
delivery of part of the stock he had contracted to buy at the higher,
agreed-upon price. Powell comments that, on the same principle,
when the price has risen, a seller in breach would be ordered to
transfer the stock at the agreed-upon price and "to account for all
the dividends from the time at which it ought to have been transferred.' ' " Thus, an order to pay money would be tacked on to a
decree to provide specific performance, putting the contracting
party into the position in which he would have been had the contract been performed on time.
Horwitz's argument must therefore be limited to the assertion
that the expectation principle was not adopted at common law in
actions for money damages. Before examining the evidence, I should
like to make two preliminary comments. Horwitz relates the alleged
failure of pre-1790 courts to award expectation damages to the alleged lack of separation between the law of contract and that of
property; he sets up an antithesis between his "title theory of exchange" and the award of expectation damages. This is an odd
antithesis. As Fuller and Perdue point out in their discussion of the
justification for protecting the expectation interest:
The essence of a credit economy lies in the fact that it tends
to eliminate the distinction between present and future (promised) goods. Expectations of future values become, for purposes
of trade, present values. In a society in which credit has become
a significant and pervasive institution, it is inevitable that the
expectancy created by an enforceable promise should be regarded as a kind of property, and breach of the promise as an
injury to that property. 8
Indeed, if contract is seen as a mechanism for granting property
rights, the natural measure of damages will be the value of that
property, which is the measure of expectation damages.
Moreover, it is a historical misconception to suppose that before the nineteenth century there were settled legal rules or principles governing damage assessment, which had to be correctly explained in directing juries if the verdict was to stand. 7 As Horwitz
2 J. POWELL, supra note 50, at 232-33. See also Gardener v. Pullen & Phillips, 2 Vern.
394, 23 Eng. Rep. 853 (Ch. 1700), discussed at note 120 infra.
" Fuller & Perdue, supra note 81, at 59.
'7 Sedgwick, relying on both the English and American authorities, emphasized this
point:
Indeed, for a long time after the distinction between law and fact was established, and
the separate province of judge and jury defined with considerable accuracy, there ap-
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concedes, damages were predominantly treated as an unregulated
jury matter, and only by slow degrees were rules of law of any kind
evolved on this subject.88 Judges did sometimes advise and direct
juries on assessment, but they recognized that assessment was ultimately a matter within the jury's discretion. In particular, there was
an extreme reluctance to interfere with a jury decision on the ground
that the damages awarded were too small or too large. There seems
to have been no suggestion before 176889 that a retrial might be
granted on the ground of judicial misdirection regarding the assessment of damages. Indeed, before the nineteenth century, very few
cases at all were reported that dealt with the assessment of damages
for breach of contract.
It is of course reasonable and historically legitimate to try to
discover what assumptions guided a practice that eventually hardened into law. Eighteenth-century jurists undoubtedly had ideas
about the proper way for the jury to set about its task, and some of
these ideas may eventually have become canonized. But certain
obstacles inevitably hamper investigations into judicial practices
that have not yet become regulated. The first is that in the absence
of any form of review designed to achieve uniformity, the practice
may not have been uniform, either at one time, or over a period of
time; different and imprecise ideas may have been current. Second,
since damage assessment was largely viewed as a jury matter, the
law reports were little interested in the subject. Third, what the
pears to have been an almost total want of any clear and definite understanding of these
rules of damages which we now have to consider.
1 T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES § 19, at 14-15 (9th ed. 1912) (1st ed.
New York 1847).
0 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 925-26. The best treatment of the subject is Washington,
Damages in Contractat Common Law (pts. 1 & 2), 47 L.Q. REv. 345 (1931), 48 id. 90 (1932).
The point made in the text is very apparent from the earliest treatise on the subject, J. SAYER"
THE LAW OF DAMAGES (Dublin 1792), particularly chapters 30-33, at 197-237, dealing with the
granting of a new trial or a new writ of enquiry on account of the smallness or excessiveness
of the damages awarded.
U Smee v. Huddlestone (C.P. 1768), noted in J. SAYER, supra note 88, at 49-52. It seems
to have been assumed in the eighteenth century that a misdirection could be a ground for a
new trial. In the classic description of the system, one of the grounds stated for the grant of
a new trial is the misdirection of the judge. 2 W. TDD, THE PRACTICE OF THE CouRTs OF KING'S
BENCH AND COMMON PLEAS 907 (9th ed. London 1828) (1st ed. London 1790). In fact, however,
instances of this happening in the eighteenth century were rare. The practice appears to have
begun in Holt's time. See No. 24 Anon., 2 Salk. 649, 91 Eng. Rep. 552 (K.B. 1702). See also
How v. Strode, 2 Wils. 269, 95 Eng. Rep. 804 (K.B. 1765). In his account of the procedure at
a trial, which is very detailed, Tidd does not discuss the directing of juries. The following
quotation is all we get: "The evidence being gone through, and summed up by the judge, the
jury, if they think proper, may withdraw from the bar, to deliberate on their verdict." 2 W.
TIDD, supra, at 867.
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reporters tended to record was the unusual and not the normal."
With these points in mind, I now turn to a consideration of the
evidence on Horwitz's claim that the measure of damages at common law for breach of contract was restitutionary until the 1790s2
1. Measures of Damages in the Sixteenth, Seventeenth, and
Eighteenth Centuries. The claim that restitution was once the measure of damages at common law for breach of contract has in fact
been advanced before by Williston9 2 and Ames,93 but only with reference to the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century history of assumpsit,
where it has long been shown to be incorrect. 4 When applied to the
law of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, this conclusion
bristles with difficulties that Horwitz does not discuss at all. A law
of contract based wholeheartedly upon the restitutionary principle
would have differed quite radically, in both its general structure and
its details, from the law of assumpsit in the eighteenth century and
earlier.
If one considers the purest example of actionable mutual promises, the wager, under restitutionary principles the only possible
remedy would be recovery of the stake if it had been prepaid. But
it is quite undisputed that wagers were not prepaid and yet were
enforced. In the case of a sale of goods, under restitutionary principles the buyer's remedy would be only an action to recover a prepayment. Yet as far back as I am aware, courts awarded damages measured by the value of the bargain, though peculiar facts may sometimes have cast doubt on whether this was the proper measure to
apply in the circumstances. In pre-assumpsit days, in a sale of fungibles, the buyer's remedy was debt "in the detinet," with judgment
for the price or value of the goods; price and value may not have
been distinguished. But as soon as assumpsit came to be used, the
" This surely is the explanation for the reporting of Nurse v. Barns, T. Raym. 77, 83 Eng.
Rep. 43 (K.B. 1663), and James v. Morgan, 1 Lev. 111, 83 Eng. Rep. 323 (K.B. 1663),
discussed in A. SIMPSON, supra note 42, at 585-86 (where James v. Morgan is mistakenly
rendered Jones v. Morgan).
,1Specific performance can be set to one side. It is, as we have seen, merely an application of the expectation principle. See text and notes at notes 81-82 supra.
3 S. WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1338, at 2393 (1920).
'3 J. AMES, LECTURES ON LEGAL HISTORY 143-44 (1913). See A. SIMPsoN, supra note 42, at
582-87.
" Id. at 56-57; Washington, supra note 88, 47 L.Q. Rzv. at 371-79.
S See A. SIMPSON, supra note 42, at 56-57. Horwitz claims that "goods came to be
thought of as fungible" only late in the history of contract. Horwitz, supra note 1, at 918.
This claim is susceptible to two interpretations. It could inean either that contracts for the
sale of nonspecific goods by number, weight, or measure were not made or litigated, or that
lawyers did not grasp the conceptual difference between specific and fungible goods. Regardless which view Horwitz intended, his claim seems impossible to square with the evidence.
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concept of loss caused by the breach brought up the idea of a comparison between the market and the contract price.
In one of the earliest known cases on assumpsit for failure to
deliver, Pykeryng v. Thurgoode5 (1532), there is no suggestion that
the action was conceived as confined merely to the recovery of prices
partially prepaid. This was a brewery case; the plaintiff alleged that
through failure to deliver, "he was left without malt and compelled
to buy malt at a far greater price." 9 What was claimed and awarded
was apparently the downpayment plus the difference between the
contract price and the higher market price.9
Again, the elaborate rules regarding the mutual dependence of
promises 9 would have had no function at all in a world in which
contractual remedies were restitutionary only, leading to the recovery of money paid or property (or its value) handed over. Horwitz's
thesis is not developed to a point at which it is possible to see how
he would deal with difficulties of these kinds, nor does he explain
how the quasicontractual or restitutionary remedies evolved in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were needed in a world in
which all assumpsit actions were merely restitutionary. His argument is essentially negative, and in specific terms it relies on two
cases: Flureau v. Thornhil'"° and Dutch v. Warren"' The argument
is that these cases do not establish the expectation principle, with
the implication that they reflect the general acceptance of restitution as the measure of damages in contract law.102
In Flureau v. Thornhill10 3 (1776), plaintiff purchased a rent at
Such contracts existed and they were not rare exceptions. For examples of litigation in
assumpsit on such contracts, see Orwell v. Mortoft, Y.B. 20 Hen. VII, 8 pl. 18 (C.P. 1505);
Norwood v. Read, 1 Plowd. 180, 75 Eng. Rep. 277 (K.B. 1558); Pykeryng v. Thurgoode (K.B.
1532), reported in 2 SPELMAN'S REPORTS 247 (Selden Soc., J. Baker ed. 1978). The early law
is discussed in J. Baker, Introduction,in id. at 275-86. See also Milsom, Sale of Goods in the
Fifteenth Century, 77 L.Q. REv. 257 (1961).
,6(K.B. 1532), reported in 2 SPELMAN'S REPORTS, supra note 95, at 247. The case is
discussed by Baker, Introduction, id. at 283-85.
(K.B. 1532), reported in 2 SPELMAN'S REPoRrS, supra note 95, at 247, 248.
Although it is impossible to tell exactly how the damages were awarded, the explanation I have offered is also the one given by Baker, Introduction, in id. at 284. Baker cites
several other cases from this period in which juries awarded damages comprising the return
of the down payment (or the sum lent) and the difference between contract and market price
(or, where appropriate, loss in rent). Id. at nn.2-4.
11 See text and notes at notes 57-58 & 77 supra.
'10 2 Black. W. 1078, 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (C.P. 1776), discussed in Horwitz, supra note 1,
at 921.
,0,
1 Strange 406, 93 Eng. Rep. 598 (K.B. 1720), more fully reportedin Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1011-12, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 680 (K.B. 1760).
02 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 920-22.
113 2 Black. W. 1078, 96 Eng. Rep. 635 (C.P. 1776).
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auction and paid a deposit of £54. The defendant was unable to
make title and offered to go ahead on a defective title or to return
the deposit with interest and costs. The plaintiff rejected the offer
and sued for damages for the loss of a good bargain. The jury,
contrary to the direction of the trial judge, awarded damages of £20
as well as the return of the deposit. Evidence had been given at the
trial that the plaintiff had sold stock disadvantageously to raise the
purchase price, but the amount involved had not been quantified.
There had also been conflicting evidence relating to the question
whether the bargain was a good one.
The ruling, stated only by Grey, C.J., was that "[ulpon a
contract for a purchase, if the title proves bad, and the vendor is
(without fraud) incapable of making a good one, I do not think that
the purchaser can be entitled to any damages for the fancied goodness of the bargain,which he supposes he has lost. "I" Insofar as any
discernible principle lies behind this ruling, it would appear to be
an objection to the speculative or conjectural character of the claim.
Blackstone (speaking judicially) gave a different reason for the result. "These contracts are merely upon condition, frequently expressed, but always implied, that the vendor has a good title. if he
has not, the return of the deposit, with interest and costs, is all that
can be expected." ' For Horwitz, this case shows that eighteenthcentury courts rejected the expectation principle and awarded only
restitution damages. It appears to me that had it been the general
rule in actions of special assumpsit (as well as in actions for money
had and received) that only restitution was possible, this general
rule would have been given as a reason by at least one of the judges
whose opinions are reported, and there would have been no need to
justify the result in terms of an implied condition. Instead, the court
appears to be justifying something in the nature of an exception." 6
Dutch v. Warren' (1720), Horwitz's other specific evdence, is
a case in which an action for money had and received to the plain" Id. at 1078, 96 Eng. Rep.' at 635.
"1 Id. at 1078-79, 96 Eng. Rep. at 635.
204 The only earlier case directly dealing with the same matter seems to be Brig's Case,
Palmer 364, 81 Eng. Rep. 1125 (K.B. 1623), in which there had been prepayment of a fine
(i.e., lump sum) on purchase of a lease. It held, on facts somewhat similar to those of
Flureau, that the proper form of action was "an action on the case for loss of the benefit of
the bargain, and he will not only recover the money he gave by way of a lump sum payment,
but damages in addition for the breach of contract." Id. This holding is of course incompatible with that of Flureau.
107 1 Strange 406, 93 Eng. Rep. 598 (K.B. 1720), more fully reported in Moses v. Macferlan, 2 Burr. 1005, 1111-12, 97 Eng. Rep. 676, 680 (K.B. 1760).
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tiffs use was brought against a defendant who had been paid £ 262
10s for five shares in a copper mine to be transferred when the books
of the company opened. But when the books opened, the defendant
refused to transfer the stock, although it had declined substantially
in value since the date of the contract; nor would he return the
deposit. The question of interest to the present discussion was
whether the plaintiff should recover the sum paid over, £262 10s.,
or the value of the shares at the date'for delivery, £175. The court
followed the latter view. This holding did not restore the plaintiff
to the position in which he had been before the bargain was made,
but gave him the "benefit" of the bargain. Although the plaintiff
asked for restitution, the holding rests squarely on the expectation
principle.10 8 It is an inconceivable holding unless it was then thought
that the correct measure of damages for breach of an agreement was
the value of performance generally: it would make no sense for the
value of performance to be the measure of recovery in a falling
market but not in a rising one, with one exception to which I now
turn.
In Moses v. Macferlan'09 (1760), Mansfield, C.J., followed and
approved Dutch v. Warren, adding, however, that "[i]f the five
shares had been of much more value, yet the plaintiff could only
have recovered the 262£ 10s. by this form of action." 0 The implication may be that in a rising market the plaintiff should have
used a different form of action, special assumpsit; the point Mansfield was making is that in the action for money had and received
recovery was limited, at most, to the sum alleged to have been
received."' Mansfield also glossed the earlier case by claiming that
it had been only "against conscience" for the defendant to retain
both the shares and their value, the sum of £175.112 This reference
to "conscience" as the basis of decision is not to be found in the
report of the case, and, as Horwitz points out," 3 expresses Mansfield's own thesis regarding the "equitable" nature of the action for
money had and received. But there is no necessary conflict between
understanding this form of action as one based on equitable principles, and recognizing the expectation principle as a measure of damages. Even if Mansfield had been historically correct in attributing
the decision in Dutch v. Warren to "conscience" or "equity," the
"' It is therefore misleading, though technically not incorrect, to say that the case was
"simply an action for restitution." Horwitz, supra note 1, at 940 n.124.
11 2 Burr. 1005, 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
11 Id. at 1012, 97 Eng. Rep. at 680.
"I This view is criticized by his reporter as mistaken. Id. at 1001, 97 Eng. Rep. at 680.
112

Id.

"I Horwitz, supra note 1, at 922.
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case still recognizes clearly that the essential duty of a contracting
party is to confer upon the other the value of performance, and that
is the expectation principle.
The best reason for thinking that the matter had long been
settled is the absence of cases in the eighteenth century canvassing
the choice between alternative approaches. Dutch v. Warren is not
the only early eighteenth-century case that apparently assumes the
expectation principle. Peeram v. Palmer (1712), reported in Gilbert's The Law of Evidence,11 4 involved a contract for the sale of 100
quarters of barley at a contract price of 16 a quarter, part being
prepaid and the balance payable on delivery, which was to take
place at the purchaser's malt house between harvest and Candlemas. The defendant vendor made short delivery only two days before Candlemas. The plaintiff retaliated by paying only part of the
agreed price in ready money at that time. He did pay in full before
bringing the action, but the rest of the malt was never delivered,
perhaps because of the quarrel over the incident. The jury assessed
£4 damages for the failure to deliver the balance and found, by
agreement between the parties, a special verdict. The case was
argued before Parker, C.J., as raising problems regarding the mutual dependence of promises in executory contracts; the rules for
assessing damages were not discussed. The agreed special verdict,
however, includes this finding: "That the Price of Barley between
the Time of the Contract and the Delivery of the said twenty Quarters rose about, etc. ' '11 5 It is difficult to explain this verdict unless the
orthodox expectation-damage rule was then a normal assumption,
there being otherwise no purpose in such finding of fact. The case
would, indeed, be wholly unintelligible in terms of a restitutionary
theory of damages.
Clear confirmation of the application of the principle of expectation damages in contracts for the sale of goods in the early eighteenth century is also found in the history of the enforcement of
contracts for the sale of stock. Although Horwitz gives the impression that such contracts were a late eighteenth-century phenomenon, this is not so.1"6 The South Sea Bubble, which "burst" in 1720,
had familiarized everyone with them, and even before this there was
law on the subject. It came to be settled in the nineteenth century
that as a general rule such contracts could not be specifically enforced because damages provided an adequate remedy: the pur' G. GLBE Rr, THE LAw OF EVEDEN E 194 (2d ed. London 1756) (1st ed. Dublin 1754).
",

Id. at 195.

' See note 35 supra.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[46:533

chaser could go into the market and buy stock, and he would suffer
no loss because the common law would compensate him in expectation damages for any loss due to market fluctuations.",7 This doctrine is first clearly found much earlier than Horwitz supposes; in
Cud v. Rutter 58(1719), a decree by the Master of the Rolls awarding
specific performance was reversed by Parker, L.C., who explicitly
relied on the rule at law for the assessment of damages for failure
to deliver goods. Instancing a sale of grain to be delivered on a stated
day in a market, Parker said: "[T]he buyer is left to his remedy
at law for breach of the agreement, to recover damages, (id est,) the
difference between the price agreed on by the parties, and the price
of corn upon the market day."''
t
Even earlier than this, in Gardener v. Pullen & Phillips'"
(1700), there appears to be a recognition of the same basic approach
to contractual liability, though the decision is contrary. A peialty
bond of £500 was conditioned on the transfer of £300 stock in the
old East India Company. The principle was by then established that
relief from the penalty could be obtained on the payment of proper
compensation, and since the contract date the stock had risen
sharply in value. Two solutions were offered: the defendant might
be required to pay the value at the date of the delivery.(and account
for dividends due since then) or actually to transfer £300 nominal
value of stock (worth much more on the market). The court adopted
the latter solution. It is noteworthy that both solutions assume that
the policy is to put the contracting party into the position he would
have been in if the contract had been performed.'
2. The "Transformation"of the Law of Damages. Horwitz contends' 2 that in England the "leading case" introducing the expectat 3 (1802), which dealt with
tion principle was Shepherd v. Johnson'
the replacement of stock on a rising market. In fact, as the report
makes clear, "the only question was, whether the damages should
be calculated at 1133 £ 18s. 6d., the price of the stock on the 1st
of August when it was to be replaced [i.e., the date of performance

-'

See Deloret v. Rothchild, 1 Sim. & St. 590, 57 Eng. Rep. 233 (Ch. 1824); Nutbrown
v. Thornton, 10 Ves. Jun. 159, 32 Eng. Rep. 805 (Ch. 1804).
"I 1 P. Wins. 570, 24 Eng. Rep. 521 (Ch. 1719), noted in 5 Vin. Abr. 538, pl. 21.
5 Vin. Abr. at 539.
' 2 Veto. 394, 23 Eng. Rep. 853 (Ch. 1700).
" Stent v. Bailis, 2 P. Wins. 217, 24 Eng. Rep. 705 (Ch. 1724), states an exception that
is quite compatible with the main principle: equity might order the buyer to accept delivery
where the stock had fallen by the date for delivery, but not where the company had collapsed,
refused to transfer the shares on its books, and did not expect ever to reopen its books.
12 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 937 n.101.
12 2 East 211, 102 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B. 1802).
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due]; or at 1224£ Is. the price of the stock on the day of the
trial."'2 1 A case cannot be regarded as a leading case establishing a
principle that was never -in dispute in the case. The expectation
principle was assumed in Shepherd.15 All that was at issue was its
precise application: Was the value of performance to be measured
2
as of the date of performance or the date of the trial? 1
The basic principle of expectation damages was not a subject
of argument in any of the numerous cases dealing with this and
similar points in the law of sale of goods; nor was it ever contended
that the purchaser could obtain only restitution. 27 From this I
conclude that the award of expectation damages was the norm, that
the matter was not controversial, 128 and that the cases at the turn

"2Id. at 211, 102 Eng. Rep.

at 349-50.
12 It was apparently also assumed in Sanders v. Kentish & Hawksley, 8 T.R. 162, 101
Eng. Rep. 1323 (K.B. 1799), discussed in Shepherd v. Johnson, 2 East. 211, 212, 102 Eng.
Rep. 349, 350 (K.B. 1802). See also cases collected in note 127 infra.
121The principle established in the stock cases was that where the defaulting party had
the use of the plaintiff's money, as in the case of a loan of stock, or where there had been
prepayment, the measure of damages where stock had risen was calculated on the basis of
the value of the stock on the date when delivery had been due or on the date of the trial, but
not at any intermediate point. See Shepherd v. Johnson, 2 East 211, 102 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B.
1802); Owen v. Routh, 14 C.B. 327, 139 Eng. Rep. 134 (C.P. 1854); M'Arthur v. Lord Seaforth,
2 Taunt. 257, 127 Eng. Rep. 1076 (C.P. 1810); Harrison v. Harrison, 1 Car. & P. 412, 171 Eng.
Rep. 1253 (1824) (nisi prius); Downes v. Back, 1 Stark 318, 171 Eng. Rep. 485 (1816) (nisi
prius). In Sanders v. Kentish & Hawksley, 8 T.R. 162, 101 Eng. Rep. 1323 (K.B. 1799), where
the price of the stock fell between the date delivery was due and the date of the trial, the
court took the view that the value at the date of delivery was the correct rule. The issue was
long debated in American law. See, e.g., 4 T. SEDGWICK, supra note 87, § 1256j, at 2586-87.
I" Of the English cases cited by Horwitz, supra note 1, at 940 n.123, none involves the
least suggestion that the expectation principle was in doubt. Leigh v. Paterson, 8 Taunt. 540,
129 Eng. Rep. 493 (C.P. 1818), holds that the last day for delivery is to be the moment for
applying the contract-price/market-price rule. Gainsford v. Carroll, 2 B. & C. 624, 107 Eng.
Rep. 516 (K.B. 1824), distinguishes the stock cases as being cases in which the plaintiff did
not have the use of his money and therefore could recover on the basis of the market value
at the time of trial and not when delivery had been due. Greening v. Wilkinson, 1 Car. & P.
625, 171 Eng. Rep. 1344 (1825) (nisi prius), is in fact an action of trover, and is therefore not
directly relevant; it appears to have disapproved Mercer v. Jones, 3 Camp. 477, 170 Eng. Rep.
1452 (1813) (nisi prius). The decisions on trover assumed that the measure of damages was
the value of the goods, but differences arose about whether this should be calculated at the
date of conversion or, when values fluctuated, at some later date.
"2 Horwitz states that Powell's "only recognition of the effect of changes in the market
on contracts of sale is his statement that if, after a contract for delivery of corn, the price
falls to 5 pounds, the buyer 'will be entitled either to. . . [the] corn, or five pounds,"' and
that Powell's chapter on damages does not mention expectation damages. Horwitz, supra
note 1, at 940 n.124 (quoting 1 J. PowELL, supra note 50, at 409). This is misleading. Powell
states this principle on the page from which Horwitz took the quotation:
But if, by reason of improper delay, the value of the subject stipulated about is varied
between the time of the contract being made, and its being performed, the loss must be
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of the century are refining a received principle in detail, this refinement going hand in hand with increased supervision of jury awards.
As for the American cases, Horwitz argues that here, too, the
expectation-damage rule entered through cases dealing with
stock. 129The implication is that it replaced some other rule, presumably based on restitution. Part of Horwitz's argumeit involves the
implication that the courts were hesitant in adopting the novel approach. The cases simply fail to support this interpretation.
In Pennsylvania, the earliest recorded decision is Lewis v.
30 (1786), which deals with a sale of wheat, not stock, and
Carradan'
states that "the rule or measure of damages in such cases is to give
the difference between the price contracted for and the price at the
time of delivery.""'3 In the context, this measure of damages is not
presented as an innovation, and the case goes further in envisaging
possible recovery for loss or profits. Horwitz attempts to minimize
the importance of this decision as "this one exception,"' 32 but this
explanation will not do. The case shows that as early as 1786 courts
applied the expectation principle to the sale of goods without any
hint that they were doing something novel.
Another Pennsylvania case, Marshall v. Campbell' 3 (1791),
quite explicitly applies the sale of goods rule to stock: the decision
3
is based on the earlier unpublished opinion in Lewis v. Carradan,,1
a reliance dismissed by Horwitz as "anomalous. ' ' 35 Among the authorities relied on in Marshallare the English decisions in Gardener
1 3
v. Pullen & Phillips
(1700) and probably either Cud v. Rutter
(1719) or Dorison v. Westbrook (1721).137 There is no suggestion in
borne by the party who was to carry the contract into execution; as if one were bound
under a penalty to transfer stock at a given time, and he neglected so to do, and the
stock rose in the mean time; he should transfer the stock stipulated in specie, and not
so much as it was worth, on the day when he ought to have transferred it.
1 J. PowEL, supra note 50, at 409. Powell's reference is to Gardener v. Pullen & Phillips, 2
Vern. 394, 23 Eng. Rep. 853 (Ch. 1700), with a quaere. See text at notes 85 and 120 supra.
Powell's formulation of the principle in terms of risk produces the same result as the expectation principle.
2 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 937.
130Unpublished opinion; the Chief Justice's notes on the case are quoted at length in
Marshall v. Campbell, 1 Yeates5, 36-37 (Pa. 1791). See Horwitz, supra note 1, at 940 n.121.
,31
Marshall v. Campbell, 1 Yeates 35, 37 (Pa. 1791).
11 Horwitz, supra.note 1, at 940.
' 1 Yeates 35 (Pa. 1791).
,3'
Id. at 36.
in Horwitz, supra note 1, at 940. The decision is actually based on two earlier cases: Cox
v. Fox and Lewis v. Carradan,both apparently unpublished.
136
2 Vern. 394, 23 Eng. Rep. 853 (Ch. 1700). See text at note 120 supra.
237 1 P. Wins. 570, 24 Eng. Rep. 521 (Ch. 1719), noted in 5 Vin. Abr. 538, pl. 21 at 540.
See text at note 118 supra. The reference in Marshall v. Campbell is not to the name of the

1979]

Horwitz and the History of Contracts

Marshallof any alternative approach to the assessment of damages.
Pennsylvania cases in 1793,138 1795,111 and 17961" follow the same
doctrine. As Horwitz himself points out,' the courts say nothing in
these cases to suggest that they are introducing a radically new
principle for determining damages.
In Virginia, the basis for the supposed transformation is Groves
v. Graves4 2 (1790). Groves concerned a contract for the payment of
£260 on a specified date, payable in stock certificates at an agreed
valuation: 26p. (the market price at the date of contracting) per. £ 1
nominal value if paid on time, and 13p. in case of default. The
underlying transaction was a loan, and the contract merely made
the normal provision of a double sum as penalty, adapting the form
of contract to the exigencies of an economy short of specie. The jury
awarded the penalty and used for valuation purposes the market
value at the date of trial. The Chancellor enjoined enforcement of
the decree. The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed the Chancellor,
but it held the jury's award incorrect on two accounts: what should
have been awarded was only the market value (that is, the nonpenal
valuation), and this at the date of delivery, not the date of the
trial.4 3 Again, there is no hint in the case that there was anything
novel or controversial in the adoption of the expectation principle.
The case is merely concerned with its application to this particular
contract.
In South Carolina, the first case that Horwitz uses is Davis v.
Richardson' (1790), concerning a loan of Carolina stock with a
contract to repay in stock. In argument, Counsel contended:
It was therefore exactly similar to the sale or contract for stock
in England. That in all cases, where a specific thing or property
of any kind is to be delivered, and the party fails in delivering
it, the value of the property at the time of delivery, and not the
value at the time of contract, is the true and governing rule of
estimation.'
case, but to 5 Vin. 510, which must surely be a slip for 5 Vin. 538, on which Cud v. Rutter is
found (pl. 21), or 5 Vin. 540, pl. 22, which reports Dorison v. Westbrook (Ch. 1721).
"' Livingston v. Swanwick, 2 Dall. 300 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793).
"' Gilchreest v. Pollock, 2 Yeates 18 (Pa. 1795).
14 Graham v. Bickham, 4 Dall. 149 (Pa. 1796).
" Horwitz, supra note 1, at 939 n.119.
1421 Va. (1 Wash.) 1 (1790), discussed in Horwitz, supra note 1, at 939.
"1 1 Va. (1 Wash.) at 3.
"' 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 105 (1790), discussed in Horwitz, supra note 1, at 937.
"' 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 105, 106 (1790) (italics omitted). At this date there was no rule of
expectation damages in England, according to Horwitz, supra note 1, at 937, but his view
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The court did not find the case problematic: "[This is not a case
of difficulty in settling the principle, but] it is of extensive importance to the community that the principle should now be settled and
ascertainedwith precision."I" The court addressed itself to this task
and ruled that if no date for delivery was fixed, the value must be
taken at the time of trial. The issue in the case was not the more
general question of choosing between expectation damages and
some alternative approach.
Horwitz claims that the later case of Atkinson v. Scot"47 (1793)
shows that the expectation rule was under attack: he states that
Charles Pinckney argued there "that the allowance of expectation
damages was nothing more than the allowance of usury."'' 8 In fact,
Pinckney never made so bizarre a claim. The underlying transaction
involved in Atkinson was a loan for one year. Debt was brought on
a bond conditioned on repayment of an indent (a government bond).
The plaintiff attempted to argue that a subsequent parol agreement
had been made providing that if the indent was not returned on the
day fixed in the condition, it should be converted into a specie debt
and paid at the nominal value, pound for pound. Pinckney argued,
first, that parol variation was impossible, and, second, that if it was
allowed, the transaction would plainly be usurious as vastly exceeding the permitted rate of interest, because the nominal value of the
indent (some £1267) was about eight and one-half times its market
value of some £150. The court, relying on Davis v. Richardson,with
which Pinckney did not quarrel, agreed and applied the expectation
rule: the plaintiff was entitled to what he had the right to expect,
the return of his loan (in indents or equivalent value in specie) with
49
normal interest.'
Horwitz is wrong in supposing from the case that the stock had
appreciated 850 percent and that the case concerned speculation in
a rising market. We are not told in the case whether the stock had
risen at all. We are told only that the stock was worth-presumably
at the time of the trial, but quite possibly at the time of the loan as
well-less than its face value, £850 nominal being worth approximately £100 specie. The issue in the case was whether an 850 percent penalty clause (added in a parol agreement at that) should be
obviously not held in South Carolina in 1790. Counsel relied on Gardener v. Pullen & Phillips,
2 Vern. 394, 23 Eng. Rep. 853 (Ch. 1700).
' 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 106. Horwitz, supra note 1, at 938, quotes this sentence without
the first clause, which I have bracketed.
117 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 307 (1793).
" Horwitz, supra note 1, at 938.
"' 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) at 309.
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enforced; the issue was not, as Horwitz interprets it, whether a
rising market makes expectation damages usurious.
In sum, the known American cases do not support the picture
presented by Horwitz of a transformation of the law of measure of
damages. The stock cases applied the established common-law rule
governing sale of goods to the sale of stock and refined the details
of that rule. The doctrine was probably derived from English law.
Quite aside from his misreading of some of these cases, Horwitz
adopts a fundamentally misconceived approach to his evidence.
Even when he is aware that a case assumes the expectation principle
and deals only with problems of its application, the absence of earlier reported cases on damages in a particular state leads Horwitz
to conclude that the case under discussion introduced the expectation principle for the first time in that state. Although this might
happen occasionally, it is inconceivable that a new principle could
be introduced in state after state without a hint of its novelty.
Indeed, it is a telling point against Horwitz's supposed conflict between "equitable" and capitalist-serving principles that none of the
cases even hints at the existence of any dispute about whether expectation is the correct general principle for the assessment of dam1 50
ages.
C.

Specific Performance and Inadequacy of Consideration

Horwitz asserts that in the eighteenth century there was a
"well-established doctrine that equity courts would refuse specific
enforcement of any contract in which they determined that the
consideration was inadequate." ' ' This doctrine, Horwitz implies,
was the clearest example of the persistence of just-price conceptions
in the eighteenth century. Horwitz argues generally that the text
writers on contract law,1 52 beginning with Powell in 1790, attacked
doctrines of the just price.'53 He presents the rejection of these doctrines by the courts as an important element in the transformation
of contract law. 5 '
I do not dispute that eighteenth-century courts, like courts in
the nineteenth century and today, were occasionally loath to enI" See also Wigg v. Garden, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 357, 358 (1794), in which the court, in
response to an argument that in stock cases the value at the date of contract should be
awarded, said that it had repeatedly held the correct rule was to award the value at the date
of delivery.
"' Horwitz, supra note 1, at 923 (footnote omitted).
152 Horwitz's analysis of the text writers is criticized in Part II of this article.
' See text and notes at notes 20-30 supra.
"' Horwitz, supra note 1, at 923, 947.
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force contracts they considered unfair, whether the unfairness was
evidenced by price or other terms. The scanty evidence from the
earlier period does not allow us to say whether courts were more
likely to disapprove of sharp bargains and to find a way to avoid
enforcing them in the eighteenth century than in the nineteenth.
The English reports in the eighteenth century do contain a number
of cases in which insufficiency or exorbitancy of price is raised in
Chancery litigation as a ground for resisting specific performance or
rescinding a contract. The evidence for a "well-established doctrine" that equity would refuse specific performance on grounds of
mere inadequacy of consideration is very weak, however. The cases
are inconsistent, and the poor quality of some of the reports, as well
as the presence in most of the cases in point of other factors that
may have been regarded as relevant to the decisions, makes it very
difficult to derive a doctrine from them with any assurance.
Furthermore, even where equity refused specific performance
on grounds, at least in part, of inadequacy of consideration, the bite
of such action might have been less painful to the unjust than Horwitz believes. Such refusal would normally refer the plaintiff to his
remedy at law, and there, although Horwitz denies it, the normal
measure of damages was based on the expectation principle. 5 The
plaintiff might therefore still end up with the financial benefit of his
bargain, though recovery was subject to the risk that the jury would
refuse to award the full measure of damages"' or even that the court
itself would find a way, as courts often do, not to enforce a bargain
it found unjust. Just-price notions would have their maximum force
in those cases in which inadequacy of price was a ground for an
equity court not merely to refuse specific performance but to rescind
the contract. Cases that even approach such a result are, however,
exceedingly rare in the eighteenth century.
1. Eighteenth-Century English Cases. In 1740, in Barnardiston v. Lingood,1 57 Lord Hardwicke did say that "[in the case
of a hard bargain, where it is not absolutely executed, but executory only, the constant rule of the court is, not to carry it into
execution. 1 5 This is a somewhat narrower doctrine than the one
stated by Horwitz. Although courts applied the doctrine in a number of cases in the second half of the eighteenth century, the evidence does not support Lord Hardwicke's claim that it was applied
05

See pp. 547-61 supra.

150See text at notes 87-89 supra & note 241 infra.

2 Atk. 133, 26 Eng. Rep. 484 (Ch. 1740).
Id. at 134, 26 Eng. Rep. at 485.
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before his time, or that it ever became "the constant rule of the
court." The early eighteenth-century cases that come closest are a
group that arose out of the general fever of speculation associated
60
with the South Sea Bubble around 1720.'11 In Savile v. Savile,'
under what the Lord Chancellor called "a general delusion [of] the
nation,""' an excessive price of£10,500 was bid at auction for Halifax House in St. James, and a deposit of £1000 paid. When the buyer
refused to go through with the deal, the vendor sued for specific
performance. Lord Macclesfield not only refused specific performance, he set aside the contract, thus taking away from the plaintiffvendor his action at law-but only on forfeiture of the deposit,
62
which was tantamount to an award of liquidated damages.
Other cases were less willing to interfere with contract. In Keen
v. Stuckeley13 (1721), a case of exorbitant price, the possibility of
refusing specific performance (and leaving the parties to law) was
expressly raised and treated as "a very doubtful Point"' 4 before the
Lords. It was left doubtful.16 5 In Thomson v. Harcourt' (1722),
another case arising "[d]uring the time of the wicked execution of
the South-Sea scheme, and of the general infatuation thereby occasioned," '67 the court did not allow exorbitancy of price as a ground
-' See also Howell v. George, 1 Mad. 1, 9 n.1, 56 Eng. Rep. 1, 4 n.1 (Ch. 1815), for hints
in the very early eighteenth century of a discretion to refuse specific performance for unreasonable contracts or those involving hardship.
"0 1 P. Wins. 745, 24 Eng. Rep. 596 (Ch. 1721), abridged in 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 679, pl. 4, 22
Eng. Rep. 570, pl. 4.
1
262 Id.
at 745, 24 Eng. Rep. at 596, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. at 679, p . 4, 22 Enrg. Rep. at 570.
26 There was a similar situation in Jennison v. Balkley (Ch. 1721), where the chancellor
also discharged the defendant of his contract upon forfeit of his deposit. The case is unreported, but it is mentioned in Savile v. Savile, 1 P. Wins. 745, 748 n.1, 24 Eng. Rep. 596, 597
n.1 (Ch. 1721). The following note, however, makes it clear that "this is not the general law
of the Courts; and the decision was probably founded on the general delusion of the times,
as taken notice of by Lord Macclesfield." Id. at 748 n.2, 24 Eng. Rep. at 597 n.2.
'1 Gilb. Rep. 155, 25 Eng. Rep. 109 (H.L. 1721). The decision is also reported under the
name Kien v. Stukeley, 1 Bro. 191, 1 Eng. Rep. 506 (H.L. 1722 [sic]).
M6Gilb. Rep. at 155, 25 Eng. Rep. at 109.
"4 The Exchequer, in proceedings on the equity side, had decreed specific performace of
this contract for the purchase of land at a price forty times its annual rent. The House of
Lords, after debating whether a court of equity should decree specific performance where the
bargain appeared to be unconscionable, reversed the Exchequer on the different ground that
the plaintiff had failed to perform his side of the bargain because he had not made out the
title by the date covenanted. Id. at 156, 25 Eng. Rep. at 109-10. It may not be irrelevant that
this case, too, was related to the South Sea Bubble, the defendant claiming that he had
offered so much for the land only becuse of the "general delusion, which all men lay under,
as to. . .a supposed vast increase of their riches." 1 Bro. at 192, 1 Eng. Rep. at 506.
"I 1 Bro. 193, 1 Eng. Rep. 508 (H.L. 1722).
1"7

Id.
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for refusing specific performance. The parties had agreed to transfer
stock with a fare value of £1000 for £9200, secured by a penalty bond
for £6000 and the deposit of documents with a stakeholder. The
stock was of little value by the time of the final decision; whether
the price was exorbitant at the time of the contract is unclear. On
the purchaser's failure to accept delivery, the seller commenced an
action at law in the Exchequer for damages. The purchaser replied
with a bill in equity for relief against the contract, the penalty, and
the loss of the deposit. This provoked a cross bill by the seller for
specific performance. Holding that the contract was partially rendered void by statute, the Exchequer, in proceedings on the equity
side, specifically enforced the remainder, requiring the purchaser to
accept delivery of £ 290 stock at the same price pro rata (£920: £100)
as in the contract. The Lords upheld this decision. Plaintiff's counsel argued successfully that "though the great fall of South-Sea
stock might be a general calamity to the nation, yet, as it was not
just to relieve one subject against law at the expence [sic] and ruin
of another, so neither could it be for the public utility."'' 5
The first known decisions in which equity refused specific performance and also apparently granted no damages are Lord Hardwicke's own, leading to the suspicion that he was trying to introduce
a new principle under the guise of stating an accepted rule. A number of his decisions from 1740 on emphasize the discretionary character of specific performance and suggest a general relief against
"hardship." 6' ' But even Lord Hardwicke, who claimed that Chancery would refuse to enforce executory contracts for inadequacy,
stated that executed contracts would not be rescinded solely on the
basis of inadequacy.1 0 And most of the cases do not go even that far.
Barnardiston v. Lingood"'' (1740) involved a bargain with an expectant heir, and such "catching bargains" were sometimes treated
as a special category,17 2 though whether this had always been so is
unclear. In Buxton v. Lister1 3 (1746), a case involving a contract for
the purchase of timber trees, Lord Hardwicke said, "Nothing is
more established in this context, than that every agreement of this
'"

Id. at 198, 1 Eng. Rep. at 512.

Faine v. Brown (Ch. 1750) (unreported), noted in Ramsden v. Hylton, 2 Ves. Sen. 304,
307, 28 Eng. Rep. 196, 198 (Ch. 1751); City of London v. Nash, 3 Atk. 512, 26 Eng. Rep. 1095,
1 Ves. Sen. 12, 27 Eng. Rep. 859 (Ch. 1747); Joynes v. Statham, 3 Atk. 388, 26 Eng. Rep.
1023 (Ch. 1746); Barnardiston v. Lingood, 2 Atk. 133, 26 Eng. Rep. 484 (Ch. 1740).
11 See Nichols v. Gould, 2 Ves. Sen. 422, 28 Eng. Rep. 270 (Ch. 1752); text at note 158
supra.
"1 2 Atk. 133, 26 Eng. Rep. 484 (Ch. 1740).
In See Chesterfield v. Janssen, 1 Atk. 301, 305, 26 Eng. Rep. 191, 194-95 (Ch. 1750).
'7 3 Atk. 383, 26 Eng. Rep. 1020 (Ch. 1746).
'e
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kind ought to be certain, fair and just in all its parts.' '1 4 But he

based his holding on misrepresentation, not on inadequacy of consideration. The first unambiguous decision I know of refusing specific performance on grounds of inadequacy of consideration is
Underwood v. Hitchcox75 (1749), but it is very inadequately reported.
Subsequent decisions, to the time of Lord Eldon, are consistent
in reasoning with Lord Hardwicke's approach, 7 but they do not rest
on the single ground of mere inadequacy. Thus, in Gwynne v.
Heaton1" (1778), which goes farther than most, Lord Thurlow said
there must be "an inequality so strong, gross, and manifest" that
no man of ordinary common sense would consider making such a
bargain; 78 finding such inequality in the facts before him, he set
aside the deeds at issue. Ten years later, in Day v. Newman,'7
Ardern, M.R., (Lord Alvaney) refused, on the ground of inadequacy
of price, to enforce an executory contract because the inadequacy
was "so enormous, that all mankind must at the first mention of it
concur in thinking it so."''' Although he suggested that the court

would have acted as it did even if the inadequacy had been less
egregious, the doctrine on which the courts relied in the few cases,
from the middle of the eighteenth century on, refusing specific performance on grounds of inadequacy alone was far less wide than
8
Horwitz's formulation.' '
Further, while refusal of specific performance may have left the
plaintiff without adequate remedies as a practical matter,
eighteenth-century courts did not set aside contracts on grounds of
"

Id. at 386, 26 Eng. Rep. at 1022.
,,51 Ves. Sen. 279, 26 Eng. Rep. 1031 (Ch. 1749).
'" Heathcote v. Paignon, 2 Bro. C.C.167, 29 Eng. Rep. 96 (Ch. 1787); Griffith v. Spratley, 1 Cox 383, 29 Eng. Rep. 1213 (Ch. 1787) (Eyre, L.C.B.), noted in Heathcote v. Paignon,
2 Bro. C.C. at 179 n.4, 29 Eng. Rep. at 102 n.4; Gwynne v. Heaton, 1 Bro. C.C. 1, 28 Eng.
Rep. 949 (Ch. 1778) (Thurlow, L.C.); How v. Weldon & Edwards, 2 Ves. Sen. 516, 28 Eng.
Rep. 330 (Ch. 1754) (Sir Thos. Clarke, M.R.).
"7 1 Bro. C.C. 1, 28 Eng. Rep. 949 (Ch. 1778).
"T Id. at 9, 28 Eng. Rep. at 953.
' 2 Cox 77, 30 Eng. Rep. 36 (Ch. 1788).
,,O
Id. at 82, 30 Eng. Rep. at 38. The defendant had agreed, at age 24, to pay £6,000
immediately, and £14,000 when his uncle died, for an estate valued at £9,000.
"I See text at note 151 supra. The doctrine followed by the courts may also have been

limited to inadequacy of price only, as was the civil law doctrine: the adjective "enormous"

may echo the civil law's laesio enormis. On the civil law doctrine, see text at notes 27-29

supra. In England, such a doctrine may have been connected with a general belief in the
desirability of protecting the landed interest from loss of land at inadequate prices, particularly when youth was involved. The rationale for some of the decisions may be the idea that
the contracting party has not acted freely or that he lacks full capacity to contract; the
boundary between these ideas is not distinct.
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inequality or inadequacy of consideration alone. Counsel arguing for
the refusal of specific performance naturally searched for cases in
which contracts had actually been avoided for inequality, from
which they could argue a fortiori. The South Sea Bubble cases did
not help here, since deposits were forfeited and not returned. The
favorite contender was Herne v. Meeres182 (1687), but it actually
involved a fraud on creditors who were suing the purchaser of their
debtor's estate. The case did not depend on the parties' power to
avoid the contract for inequality. There appears to be no recorded
instance of the exercise of such a power. Although it is conceivable
that isolated instances might be found in unpublished sources, this
alone would not support Horwitz's claim for the existence of a "wellestablished doctrine."
Horwitz's contention that Powell and text writers after him
attacked the eighteenth-century doctrine of inadequacy is, if true,
an argument for the existence of such a doctrine. I shall argue,
however, in the next section of this article, that Powell was not, as
Horwitz supposes, an enemy of the idea that contracts marked by
great inequality should not be specifically enforced, and perhaps
should be set aside. When Powell states that no court has yet refused specific performance for mere inequality, he is only reporting. 1 s Apparently, he did not know of the few cases that can be read
as refusing specific performance on grounds of inadequacy alone, in
particular Underwood v. Hitchcox84 (1749), although it had been in
print since 1765, and Day v. Newman"' (1788-but not published
until 1816). How he missed these cases, I do not know-it was not,
however, out of lack of sympathy with their conclusions, because he
clearly favored interfering with sharp bargains." 6 Perhaps his error
influenced courts to take a narrower view of their right to refuse
specific performance than they might have taken had he used his
opportunity to develop further the doctrine of cases like Underwood.
On the other hand, Powell was apparently the first to state clearly
the evidentiary theory of inadequacy, that inadequacy creates a
strong presumption of fraud. 87 Powell's writings, therefore, are neither evidence of a well-established doctrine of substantive inadequacy in the eighteenth century nor an attack on such a doctrine or
its underlying values.

10 1 Vern.
8

465 (Ch. 1687).
See text and notes at notes 353-367 infra.

S1 Ves. Sen. 279, 26 Eng. Rep. 1031 (Ch. 1788).
28
"
28

2 Cox 77, 30 Eng. Rep. 36 (Ch. 1788).
See text at notes 363-367 infra.
See 2 J. POWELL, supra note 50, at 157-58.
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2. American Cases after 1790. The cases on which Horwitz
relies as evidence for his claim that American courts in the eighteenth century interfered with contracts on grounds of inadequacy of
consideration all date from after 1790,188 that is, from the period
when, according to Horwitz, courts were abandoning the doctrine.
In the first reported American case dealing with the subject,
Clitherall v. Ogilvie"' (South Carolina 1792), the court refused specific performance. 9 The decision is not easy to interpret. After
pointing out that most of the cases cited by counsel were not directly
relevant, 9 ' the court stated as "a settled rule of this court" that an
agreement would not be specifically enforced unless it was "fair,
certain, just, equal in all its parts, and for adequate consideration. 1 1 2 This was dictum, of course, but that is not the important
point. There is good reason to believe that the court was not stating
a settled rule in South Carolina, but merely adopting what it
thought was the rule in England.
The language quoted above reads suspiciously like Powell's
"fair, just, reasonable, bona fide, certain, in all its parts, mutual,
useful, made upon a good or valuable consideration.' 9 3 Counsel's
version is "fair, certain and just in all its parts,"' 94 supported by a
reference to Buxton v. Lister95 (1746). The reference is to this passage in Buxton: "Nothing is more established in this court, than
that every agreement of this kind ought to be certain, fair, and just
in all its parts." ' Powell also cites this passage,'9 7 but as authority
for refusing specific performance on grounds of misrepresentation.
Furthermore, neither the court nor counsel in Clitherallmade any
explicit reference to earlier practice in South Carolina: all the authorities referred to are English."' And in Desaussure's long note to
the case, written some years later, "the court" is, oddly enough, a
M'See Horwitz, supra note 1, at 923.
1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des.) 250 (1792).
Id. at 256, 262. Counsel expressly relied on Underwood for the proposition that gross
inadequacy was a ground for refusing specific performance. Id. at 256.
at 250, 257.
' Id.
", Id. at 257-58.
13 2 J. POWELL, supra note 50, at 221.
1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des.) 250, 256 (1792).
"l 3 Atk. 383, 26 Eng. Rep. 1020 (Ch. 1746).
16 Id. at 386, 26 Eng. Rep. at 1022.
"7 2 J. PowELL, supra note 50, at 222.
"' The court relied on Powell and seems to have used him extensively, but it also cited
Underwood v. Hitchcox, 1 Ves. Sen. 279, 27 Eng. Rep. 1031 (Ch. 1749) and Gwynne v. Heaton,
1 Bro. C.C. 1, 28 Eng. Rep. 949 (Ch. 1778), neither of which is mentioned in Powell.
'
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reference to the English Court of Chancery;' 9 the opinion itself uses
the term similarly. The case suggests a reception in 1792 of the rule
believed to have been adopted in the English Court of Chancery. It
does not provide convincing evidence that the same rule represented
the received doctrine in South Carolina earlier in the eighteenth
century.
Only one other case appears to be directly relevant to the question of relief for inadequacy (or for hardship) in America in the
eighteenth century. In Ward v. Webber"' (Virginia 1794), the defendant argued, on the ground of hardship, that a conveyance of plantations, furniture, and slaves by his late father to his sister, which
the father had subsequently cancelled surreptitiously, should not be
enforced by equity.2"' In rejecting this argument, President Pendleton stated:
[Ilt is true that the court will never decree iniquity, and there
are instances, where they have refused to decree hard bargains
though fair, but these are rare, and are generally cases of glaring hardship. For in general, the court will not undertake to
estimate the speculations of parties, in a contract, but will
deem them the best judges of their own views, and will compel
a performance, though they may be eventually disappointed in
22
their expectations. 1
This passage again shows a general reluctance to interfere with contracts except in extraordinary circumstances, rather than an established doctrine or a long-standing readiness to interfere on equitable grounds.
After 1800 a change is discernible, though not quite the one
Horwitz describes. Although courts reduced, or at least failed to
develop, the scope of substantive notions of inadequacy, they also
laid the basis for continued interference with sharp bargains by
adopting a clearer evidentiary theory of inadequacy. Horwitz overlooks that the evidentiary theory in some respects expanded the
power of courts to interfere with unequal bargains; this is all the
more important because the scope of the substantive theory had
been limited to exceptional cases. The change may go back to a
"I 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des.) 250, 258 n.* (1792). Apart from Domat and Justinian, all the
authorities mentioned are English. Desaussure apparently wrote this note between the publication of 11 Ves. Jun. and of 1 Des. in 1817.
2 1 Va. (1 Wash.) 274 (1794).
201The principal arguments in the case were that the conveyance had been executed to
avoid the possibility of forfeiture for felony and that it was subject to a secret trust. Id.
Id. at 279.

1979]

Horwitz and the History of Contracts

number of observations by Lord Eldon in English Chancery cases.2 13
The most important was Coles v. Trecothick214 (1804). In Coles,
having said that the cases dealing with sales of expectancies by heirs
"go on very different principles," Lord Eldon continued: "But, farther, unless the inadequacy of price is such as shocks the conscience,
and amounts in itself to conclusive and decisive evidence of fraud
in the transaction, it is 5not itself a sufficient ground for refusing a
2
specific performance.1

This evidentiary theory of inadequacy, which may be derived
ultimately from Powell, who stated it in similar terms, 26 does not
appear to involve any change of view from the cases following Lord
Hardwicke regarding the degree of inadequacy required. 07 What
does change is the theoretical ground upon which inadequacy operates-as evidence of fraud, not as an independent, substantive
ground, and not as constituting "hardship." This can be seen as
cutting back on the eighteenth-century cases. A consequence of this
reformulation, however, was the invalidation of any distinction between the grounds for refusing specific performance of executory
contracts and for rescinding executed contracts, for it was settled
that fraud applied indifferently in both contexts.
In England, Lord Eldon's position became settled doctrine, although Fry pointed out difficulties with it.2"8 In America, Desaus-

sure accepted the idea that, as furnishing "violent presumptive evidence of fraud, imposition, or oppression in the buyer; or weakness,
ignorance, or deep necessity in the seller,

2

9

inadequacy might ac-

tually invalidate a contract. He hinted at the notion that specific
performance might be refused through inadequacy (though not for
210
inadequacy) even in cases in which the contract was not invalid.
If anything, this use of inadequacy as an evidentiary notion in" See Lowther v. Lowther, 13 Ves. Jun. 95, 103, 33 Eng. Rep 230, 233 (Ch. 1806)
(Erskine, L.C.); Burrowes v. Lock, 10 Ves. Jun. 470, 474-75, 32 Eng. Rep. 927, 929 (Ch. 1805)
(Grant, M.R.); Mortlock v. Buller, 10 Ves. Jun. 292, 305, 314, 32 Eng. Rep. 857, 862, 865 (Ch.
1804); Emery v. Wase, 8 Ves. Jun. 505, 517, 32 Eng. Rep. 451, 455 (Ch. 1803); Low v.
Barchard, 8 Ves. Jun. 133, 137, 32 Eng. Rep. 303, 304 (Ch. 1803); White v. Damon, 7 Ves.
Jun. 30, 32 Eng. Rep. 13 (Ch. 1802). In Stilwell v. Wilkins, Jac. 280, 37 Eng. Rep. 857 (Ch.
1821), Eldon was still indecisive on the issue.
2" 9 Ves. Jun. 234, 32 Eng. Rep. 592 (Ch. 1804).
20 Id.
at 246, 32 Eng. Rep. at 597. A similar doctrine is stated in Low v. Barchard, 8 Ves.
Jun. 133, 32 Eng. Rep. 303 (Ch. 1803).
m 2 J. POWELL, supra note 50 at 78, 157-58. See text at note 363 infra.
201 See text at note 180 supra.
2 E. FRY, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRAcrs §§ 279-282, at 128-31
(London 1858).
1" 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des.) at 258 n.*. See note 199 supra.
210 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des.) at 258 n.*.
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creased the significance of inadequacy of price, for I have been unable to find an instance in the eighteenth century in which a court
set aside a contract, rather than merely refusing to order specific
performance, either for inadequacy per se or for inadequacy as conclusive evidence of fraud.
The American cases, however, continued to state the law as
before, perhaps a little more restrictively for a few years. In Gregor
v. Duncan1 ' (1808), Chancellor Rutledge, who had been a member
of the court that decided Clitherall v. Ogilvie,21 2 now claimed that
it was "generally agreed" that neither executory nor executed contracts could be set aside for "mere inadequacy of price" in the
absence of fraud or some additional factor.21 3 In the context, he
apparently intended the same principle to apply to refusal of specific performance. In Campbell v. Spencer2 4 (1809), a Pennsylvania
case involving an appeal from a decision by the trial judge setting
aside a jury verdict for the defendant in an action for ejectment, the
judges sympathized with the defendant. 21 5 They said that as
chancellors they might not have granted specific performance, intimating that in equity specific performance might properly be refused in cases in which inadequacy of price combined with other
factors.216 At the same time, they stressed that the law supported the
plaintiff. They ultimately reinstated the jury verdict in favor of the
defendant on the ground that jury verdicts should not be set aside
unless they are unquestionably wrong. In Bunch v. Hurst27 (1811),
the court did set aside a contract in which the price was enormously
inadequate, but the outwitted party was a near idiot.
Butler v. Haskell2 8 (1816) is the first American decision clearly
influenced by Lord Eldon's reformulation of the doctrine. There,
211

2 S.C. Eq. (2 Des.) 636 (1808). Desaussure described this as "a very important case,"

but explained that he could not obtain much information about it. Id. at 636-37. He gave a
slightly different account of the case in his opinion in Butler v. Haskell, 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des.)
651, 696 (1816), presumably from his notes. Gregor v. Duncan does not on its face indicate
any English influence, but given the state of these reports, it is impossible to tell.
21Z 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des.) 250 (1792).
2,3 2 S.C. Eq. (2 Des.) 636, 639 (1808).
214 2 Binn. 129 (Pa. 1809).
215 Tilgham, C.J., said:
[T]here are circumstances in this transaction, which I do not like. I do not like the
sending for a man to a tavern, and bargaining for the land which supported his family,
amidst the drinking of bitters early in the morning; and I do not like a contract by which
a farmer is involved in the folly of buying a store of goods.
Id. at 133.
216Id. at 133, 135.
21 Noted in Butler v. Haskell, 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des.) 651, 697 (1816).
2114 S.C. Eq. (4 Des.) 651 (1816).
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after elaborate argument and consideration of both English and
American authorities, the South Carolina court of equity appeals set
aside an executed contract. At first instance, Chancellor Thompson
had refused relief: inadequacy, he had said, in the absence of fraud
or some other ground, was not a sufficient basis in America for either
rescinding an executed contract or refusing specific performance. 219
Desaussure, now on the bench, delivered the opinion reversing the
Chancellor, stating this principle:
[W]hereever [sic] the court perceives that a sale of property
has been made at a grossly inadequate price, such as would
shock a correct mind, this inadequacy furnishes a strong, and
in general a conclusive, presumption, though there be no direct
proof of fraud, that an undue advantage has been taken of the
ignorance, the weakness, or the distress and necessity of the
vendor: and this imposes on the purchaser a necessity to remove this violent presumption by the clearest evidence of the
fairness of his conduct; and the relief is given by the court,
either by refusing to enforce the contract, or by setting it aside
220
altogether, according to the circumstances of the case.
Again, however, as in most of the eighteenth-century cases, there
was more than mere inadequacy in Butler. Desaussure mentioned
the illiteracy and inexperience of the sellers and that the buyerdefendant had been their agent, although the opinion did not rest
on these grounds.2'
The next leading case is Seymour v. Delancy 2 (1824), in New
York. Again, both majority and minority fully considered the English and American authorities. The opinion of the minority, elaborately argued by Savage, C.J.,223 was that specific performance
might be kefused on the ground of inadequacy alone. To set aside a
contract once executed, however, the inadequacy must be so gross
21"Id.

at 675. He was extremely hostile to the idea:

This principle [relief for inadequacy], although familiar in the English courts, is some-

what novel in this country. The most of the cases there under this head, arise from young
heirs selling their expectancy, and the policy of that country seems to require that there
should be one great and influential man in a family, to the impoverishment and disinheritance of the others. A similar policy does not prevail here, nor do I think the doctrine
should be carried to so great an extent.

2n Id. at 697.

"I Id. at 682-84, 698.
2223

Cow. 445 (N.Y. 1824). This case was reported in the lower court as Seymour v.

Delancey, 6 Johns. Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1822).
m 3 Cow. 504-22. Nine Senators concurred in the minority opinion, which upheld the

view of Chancellor Kent at first instance. See Seymour v. Delancey, 6 Johns. Ch.222 (N.Y.
Ch.1822). Kent had distinguished the contrary view of Lord Eldon on the ground that Eldon
was only considering sales at auction. Id. at 229.
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as to amount to fraud under the evidentiary theory, which Savage
conceived to be restrictive in character. 4 Here, Savage said, the
contract, was executory and specific performance should be refused.
The majority view, expressed by Senator John Sudam,22 5 was that
specific performance would be refused only "where the inadequacy
of price . . . amounts to conclusive evidence of fraud."2 6 The evidentiary theory, he said, applied both to executory and executed
contracts (as Lord Eldon had suggested), and on the facts Sudam
found the inadequacy was not gross enough to constitute conclusive
2
evidence of fraud. 27
Many of the differences between Horwitz's understanding of
the significance of inadequacy of consideration and mine are reflected in the way we understand Seymour. For Horwitz, the case
marks the crucial event in an epochal struggle: "The underlying
logic of the attack on a substantive doctrine of consideration came
to fruition in America with the great New York case of Seymour v.
Delancy.,2 2 I take a less dramatic view of the case. The split in the
court, it seems to me, may have depended less on the different
theories argued by the majority and the minority than on their
different estimation of the facts. The issue, ultimately, was whether
this particular inadequacy was gross enough to justify interference
with the contract. Chancellor Kent had argued that, even if inadequacy alone was not enough in this case to justify such interference,
it was very great and, in addition, there were other grounds for
refusing specific performance. 29 Senator Sudam, on the other hand,
asserted that the contract was fair and reasonable on every count
except adequacy of price, and it was not clear to him that the price
had been inadequate at the time the contract was made. 0
Seymour v. Delancy does not introduce a new principle to
22
2
22

3 Cow. 445, 516-18 (N.Y. 1824).
Id. at 522-36. Thirteen Senators concurred.

Id. at 529.

Id. at 531.
Horwitz, supra note 1, at 944.
2n The defendants had inherited two farms from Thomas Ellison, who had contracted
to exchange them with the plaintiff for some village lots. Kent suggested that Ellison was an
alcoholic who had not been competent to enter into an enforceable bargain. 6 Johns. Ch. at
232. Kent also stated that specific performance could be refused because the plaintiff had,
as it turned out, not been ready to go forward at the date set for the exchange. Id. at 233.
Finally Kent found the price very inadequate, for he determined the farms to be worth at
least $12,000 and the village lots at most $6,000. Id. at 224, 232.
210 Senator Sudam emphasized the reasonable if speculative nature of the transaction, 3
Cow. at 528-29, and stressed that the difference between the average of six valuations of the
farmland and the lots was relatively small-12,686 to $10,856. Id. at 530-31.
2

2n
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America. The evidentiary theory of inadequacy had been accepted,
and the substantive theory rejected (at least sub silentio), in Butler
v. Haskell,2' by the same Desaussure whom Horwitz treats as an
exponent of the older, better "eighteenth-century theory. ' ' 2 2 Although Seymour was an influential case, the precise significance of
inadequacy continued to provoke argument after it. As late as 1831,
in Rodman v. Zilley, 2 3 Kent's minority view in Seymour was cited
in dictum as authority for refusing specific performance in the case
of an inequitable transaction. Above all, Horwitz's interpretation of
Seymour v. Delancy is incompatible with the view argued in this
section that inadequacy of consideration was a much narrower and
less frequently applied doctrine in the eighteenth century than Horwitz claims, and that the shift to an evidentiary theory of inadequacy did not require abandoning equitable notions, since it allowed
the courts to continue, although on a different doctrinal basis, to
interfere with bargains they found outrageous.
D. Damages at Law and the Substantive Doctrine of Consideration
For Horwitz, Seymour v. Delancy234 represents the defeat not
only of the idea that equity should refuse to decree specific performance for inadequacy of consideration but of the underlying belief
that all courts, of law as well as equity, have the right and the duty
to supervise the fairness of contracts. 5 With respect to courts of
law, this belief allegedly took the form of a "substantive doctrine of
consideration which allowed the jury to take into account not only
whether there was consideration, but also whether it was adequate,
'23
before awarding damages.
Horwitz admits there is "no direct evidence of a substantive
doctrine of consideration in eighteenth century England;" ' 7 unfortunately, his indirect evidence that this doctrine existed in English
law is minimal. Because Richard Wooddeson in his Vinerian lectures in Oxford28 said there was an implied warranty of merchanta2' 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des.) 651, 686-8, 692, 697. (1816). Desaussure rejected the substantive
theory more clearly in his note published in 1817 to Clitherall v. Ogilvie, 1 S.C. Eq. (1 Des.)
250, 258 n.* (1792). Savage, C.J., apparently did not know of these statements, because he
placed Desaussure with those disagreeing with Eldon. 3 Cow. 445, 517 (N.Y. 1824).
=1 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 923.
1 1 N.J. Eq. 320 (1831).
z Id. at 324-25.
21 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 924.
2' Id.
23 Id. at 926.
m 2 R.WOODDsON, A SYsTEMATICAL ViEw OF THE LAws OF ENGLAND 415 (Dublin 1792).
These lectures were first delivered earlier, beginning in 1777.
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bility when a sound price was given, Horwitz asserts, "one may
conclude that in both England and America, when the selling price
was greater than the supposed objective value of the thing bought,
juries were permitted to reduce the damages in an action by the
seller."2'39 This, of course, in no way follows. It is one thing to impose
liability by way of implied warranty on a seller who delivers a defective or unmerchantable thing; it is another to reduce the buyer's
indebtedness to the seller, or the seller's damages for a refusal to
accept delivery, because the price agreed is higher than "the objective value," whatever this expression is taken to mean. So far as I
am aware, there is no evidence whatsoever that such a doctrine ever
existed in England. Horwitz produces nothing except this bold non
240
sequitur.
It is true that jury awards were largely uncontrolled in the
eighteenth century. For all one knows, or may ever know, juries may
sometimes have reduced the sum recovered when the price appeared
exorbitant, or for that matter when they thought the plaintiff's girth
exorbitant. Horwitz relies 41 upon a statement by Chancellor Kent
in Seymour v. Delancey12 (1822) that "relief can be afforded [by a
jury] in damages, with a moderation agreeable to equity and good
conscience, and . . . the claims and pretensions of each party can
2 3
be duly attended to, and be admitted to govern the assessment.
Chancellor Kent's argument here was designed to show that the
existence of jury discretion makes equitable interference with contracts less necessary. In particular, he was supporting his refusal to
decree specific performance in Seymour by pointing out that an
action at law may have a more equitable outcome, because of jury
discretion, than a suit for specific performance in equity, for the
Chancellor normally must choose between giving the plaintiff all or
nothing. This sort of analysis, however, is not the application of a
"substantive doctrine of consideration" or of any legal doctrine
other than that the assessment of damages was at the discretion of
the jury.
It is misconceived in principle to confuse legally unregulated
Horwitz, supra note 1, at 927.
Horwitz refers to the unpublished contract treatise "Of Contracts," attributed to
Gilbert (c. 1720) (Hargrave Ms. 265, British Library) for support, supra note 1, at 926 n.53.
But even as Horwitz himself presents the matter, the treatise deals with implied warranties
of merchantability, not with determining the adequacy of the price irrespective of defects in
quality: In any event, for reasons given at note 284 infra, Horwitz's interpretation of this text
is incorrect. Parkinson v. Lee, 2 East. 314, 322, 102 Eng. Rep. 389, 392 (K.B. 1802), discussed in notes 289-292 infra, also deals with an implied warranty of merchantability.
241Horwitz, supra note 1, at 924.
21 6 Johns. Ch. 222 (N.Y. Ch. 1822), rev'd, Seymour v. Delancy, 3 Cow. 445 (N.Y. 1824).
23

240

213 Id.

at 232.
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practices, particularly those concerning what were by definition
questions of "fact," with legal doctrines. Nor can we be confident,
as Horwitz seems to be, that the result of the lack of regulation of
the jury was that "the community's sense of fairness was often the
dominant standard in contracts cases." '44 We simply do not know:
we do not know whether juries allowed their "sense of fairness" to
interfere with their understanding of the requirements of the law,
and we do not know whether the sense of fairness of a community
that tolerated imprisonment for debt and savage punishment for
petty crimes against property called for reduced damages when the
consideration seemed inadequate. Romanticism about juries is not
history.
So far as American law is concerned, Horwitz bases his argument on a number of case reports from Pennsylvania and Massachusetts. I will take his Pennsylvania cases in chronological order.
Wharton v. Morris" 5 (1785) hardly seems relevant. A bond was conditioned on the payment of a sum of money (the price for a quantity
of tobacco) "in lawful current money of Pennsylvania. 2 4 6 There
were two practical problems. Pennsylvania had not made any provision regarding the matter of lawful currency; McKeon, C.J., told the
jury to interpret the bond as referring to paper money issued under
the authority of Congress. Unfortunately, that paper had depreciated. The court therefore instructed the jury either to reduce the
penalty to gold or silver according to the scale of depreciation that
had overtaken paper money or, if they thought it more equitable,
to find a verdict for the value of the tobacco together with interest
on this sum from the day on which the price had been payable. This
heroic attempt to grapple with a problem of interpretation coupled
with the attendant problems of a depreciating currency hardly
amounts to a statement of "the substantive doctrine of consideration." Furthermore, as Horwitz himself points out, 4 7 because there
was no distinct equity jurisdiction in Pennsylvania, equity was
administered in the courts of law; the alternative offered to the jury
here was simply an attempt to apply the orthodox equitable principle of relief from penalties. Nobody even suggested that the tobacco
was not sold for its "objective value."
Hollingsworth v. Ogle 48 (1788) is another Pennsylvania case

'A
245
214
247
241

Horwitz, supra note 1, at 925.

1 Dall. 124 (Pa. 1785).
Id. at 124.

Horwitz, supra note 1, at 924, 926.
1 Dall. 257 (Pa. 1788).
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dominated by the unusual problems created by a rapidly depreciating currency. In-1779, when Continental paper "was worth no more
' 249
than at the rate of twenty Continental dollars for one in specie,"
the defendants borrowed £500 of Continental paper. They promised
to repay ''the full and just sum of £100 hard money or specie'" in
five years, with" 'lawful interest' "25-or four times as much as they
had borrowed in hard money equivalent. This was apparently a
speculative contract: if Continental paper appreciated to over 20
percent of its face value, the debtor would make a profit. But the
paper continued to fall. The defendants gave the plaintiff a bond of
£200 hard money or specie in consideration for this loan. When the
plaintiff brought an action of debt on the bond, they pleaded performance-they claimed to have repaid what they owed. A recent
Pennsylvania statute had declared that, of debts incurred after
January 1, 1777, creditors could recover only as much as they had
lent in real value. Under this statute, defendants apparently owed
only £ 25 hard money or specie, not £100. But this did not answer
whether all they had to pay to avoid the £200 penalty was £25, for
the bond expressly called for a payment of £100. The court said that
it had no answer to this question. "Since, therefore, we have no rule
to guide us, but the exercise of a legal discretion, it may be proper
to reflect, that it will be as inconsistent with equity to give too little,
as to give too much. '2 1 With this somewhat hazy guidance, the jury
was told to presume (that is, to pretend), in adjudicating the plea
of payment of the £100 hard money, that any sum they thought "in
equity and good conscience" ought not to be payable had in fact
been paid. 2 The decision has nothing to do with the problem of
adequacy of consideration, much less with any legal "substantive
doctrine of consideration."
Horwitz's next two cases seem quite irrelevant. Conrad v.
Conrad-l (1793) involved a promise by a father to his illegitimate
son to give him 100 acres of a 260-acre plantation if he stayed at
home to work it, which would have given a greater share to him than
to his four legitimate brothers. The court admitted evidence that
the father had intended to give the illegitimate son an equal share
of only 52 acres. The case is not relevant to inadequacy of consideraId. at 258.
Id. at 257.
'x Id. at 260.
22 Id. Horwitz reports this instruction, without any account of the case, as if it were a
customary instruction to juries in actions on bonds. Horwitz, supra note 1, at 924.
'1 4 Dall. 130 (Pa. 1793).
2
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tion. In Gilchreest v. Pollock 4 (1795), the plaintiff had sold some
stock to be delivered in the future and had taken a promissory note
in return. The buyer subsequently refused to accept delivery, and
neither he nor his guarantor would make good on the note. The
action was brought against the guarantor. In the passage relied upon
by Horwitz,25 counsel for the guarantor (so far as one can tell from
the abbreviated notes of his argument) was maintaining that speculative contracts of this character are harmful and that the court
should therefore not be anxious to favor them.2 51 He was also arguing
that there should be mutuality in an executory contract, and that
it was lacking in this case. In this context he asserted: "Contracts
of this nature tend to discourage industry. The claim of the plaintiff
should be both legal and equitable before he can call on a jury to
execute the agreement. The remedy on both sides should be mutual. ' 257 The second sentence can mean almost anything; the reduction of damages for inadequacy of consideration is nowhere so much
as mentioned.21
In the last Pennsylvania case in this group, Armstrong v.
McGhee ' (1795), the court rejected counsel's argument that inadequacy of consideration was a ground not merely for reducing damages but for setting aside the contract. There was some plausibility
in counsel's astonishing argument, for there was evidence suggesting
that the sale in question had been a joke. Armstrong was annoyed
with his valuable horse because it seemed jaded and lame after a
ride. He offered, in front of several people, to sell it for a trifling
sum. His acquaintance McGhee accepted the "offer," and Armstrong let him have the horse. Later, Armstrong asked to have the
horse back, but McGhee refused to return it, and held him to the
agreement. Armstrong maintained that he had not intended the
offer seriously, but the court refused to go behind the words uttered
and also rejected the argument from inadequacy of consideration.' "
There is no evidence that the parties argued a power to reduce
2' 2 Yeates 18 (Pa. 1795).
z1 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 924 n. 40.
r' Gilchreest v. Pollock, 2 Yeates 18, 19 (Pa. 1795) (argument of counsel).
2,7Id.
Horwitz provides no other evidence for his assertion that "Pennsylvania lawyers often
argued that a plaintiff's claim on a contract 'should be both legal and equitable before he
can call on a jury to execute the agreement,'" Horwitz, supra note 1, at 924 (quoting Gilchreest v. Pollock, 2 Yeates 18, 19 (Pa. 1795) (argument of counsel)).
n' Addis. 261 (Pa. C.P. 1795).
250 The case went to the jury, which could not agree on a verdict. In a second trial,
Armstrong got damages of £8-but still not the return of the horse. Id. at 262.

The University of Chicago Law Review

[46:533

damages in this case. 26'
With respect to the early Massachusetts cases, Horwitz writes
that in Pynchon v. Brewster26" (1766), "Chief Justice Hutchinson
instructed the jury in an action for a fixed price that they 'might
. . . if they thought, it reasonable, lessen the Charges in the
[plaintiff's] Account.' ",263 This statement of the case is, to say the
least, misleading. The crucial issue in the case revolved around the
contract's lack of a fixed price. The plaintiff, a doctor, brought
indebitatus assumpsit on a bill submitted for medicines, travel, and
attendance. Defendant had made no express promise or promises to
pay a particular sum or sums. The point at issue was whether indebitatus assumpsit was appropriate on the basis of a promise, implied from the circumstances, to pay the customary prices and
fees 2"1or whether the proper form of action was quantum meruit. If
indebitatus assumpsit did lie, the court also had to decide whether
the jury could choose to reduce the sum recoverable if the claim
appeared excessive (that is, act as if the action was brought on a
quantum meruit) or whether in this form of action it had to award
26
either the whole amount claimed by the plaintiff or nothing at all.
The court held that indebitatus assumpsit could be used, but that
the jury was not bound to choose between awarding either the whole
sum claimed or nothing.2 66 The decision was apparently soon reversed. 2 7 The case has nothing to do with any interference with an
express contract on the ground of inadequacy, or with reduction of
211Counsel did, however, refer to the barleycorn case, James v. Morgan, 1 Lev. 111,
83 Eng. Rep. 323 (K.B. 1663), in his argument for setting aside the contract. Addis. 261, 261
(Pa. C.P. 1795).
2 Quincy 224 (Mass. 1766).

supra note 1, at 925 (quoting Pynchon v. Brewster, Quincy 224, 225 (Mass.
1766) (emphasis deleted by Horwitz)). Horwitz discusses the case more fully in id. at 935.
21 Hutchinson justified allowing indebitatus assumpsit to lie (distinguishing Tyler v.
Richards, Quincy 195 (Mass. 1765), where it had not been allowed to lie for boarding and
schooling the defendant's son) on the ground that "Travel for Physicians, their Drugs and
Attendance, had as a fixed a Price as Goods sold by a Shopkeeper." Pynchon v. Brewster,
Quincy 224, 224 (Mass. 1766).
21 The reporter notes that the former rule in indebitatus assumpsit (as in debt) was that
only the precise sum was recoverable. Id. at 226. Evidence showing a different sum due would
lead to a nonsuit for variance. The quantum meruit and quantum valebant counts evolved
in order to obviate this doctrine; hence when the doctrine was abandoned in the eighteenth
century, these forms of action were abandoned as well. The precise chronology of the change
213 Horwitz,

is uncertain, but see Thompson v. Spencer (1768), noted in F. BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO

Nisi PRius 129 (2d ed. London 1775) (1st ed. London 1772).
See also text and notes at notes 322-326 infra.
265Pynchon v. Brewster, Quincy 224, 224-25 (Mass. 1766).
2"67The reporter notes that "[t]he Resolution in this Case was denied to be Law by the
whole Court, Ch. Just. absente, in the Case of Letestu & Glover, August Term, 1770." Id. at
225.
THE LAw RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT
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damages on that account; it merely allows the jury to settle reasonable remuneration in both forms of action where the parties had not
agreed on a specific price.
Horwitz follows his quotation from Pynchon v. Brewster with
another statement of Hutchinson's, from Noble v. Smith 6 (1767):
"It seems hard that an Inquiring into the Consideration should be
denied, and that Evidence should be refused in Diminution of Damages. 12 Although Hutchinson voted with the majority to exclude
evidence of inadequacy in this dispute over a promissory note, Horwitz maintains that "the court treated notes as an exception to the
general rule governing contracts" and that Hutchinson's remark
"does acknowledge the general rule. 270 In fact, the case never mentions a general rule for contracts, nor does it conclude that notes
should be treated differently from other contracts. Hutchinson
merely states the main policy arguments for and against an inquiry
into consideration in the case of promissory notes:
On the one Hand, a Note to a considerable Amount may be
obtained upon a very trifling Consideration: It seems hard that
an Inquiry into the Consideration should be denied.. .. On
the other Hand, People, upon a Settlement of Accounts, or
Matters in Dispute, think themselves quite safe in taking a
Note for the Sum due, and reasonably suppose all Necessity of
keeping the Evidence of the Consideration at an End; it would
be big with Mischief to oblige People to stand always prepared
to contest Evidence that might be offered to the Sufficiency of
27
the Consideration. 1
Hutchinson concludes that it would be better not to admit "such
Examinations into the Consideration of Notes" 72 without ever mentioning whether such inquiry should be allowed in other contracts,
or what should be the scope of such inquiry if it were allowed.
Horwitz further relies273 on passages in John Adams's student
notes24 (circa 1759), but these merely state what was quite orthodox
law: that a "sufficient Consideration" was essential in a declaration
2,1Quincy 254 (Mass. 1767).
2 Id. at 255, quoted in Horwitz, supra note 1, at 925.
21 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 925 n.46. Horwitz might have been misled by the reporter's
note to Noble v. Smith, Quincy 254, 255 (Mass. 1767) that "[t]he opposite doctrine has long
[before 18651 been established." The reporter meant long before 1865, when his report was
published; he referred to an opinion by Chief Justice Shaw, who became Chief Justice in 1831.
"I Id. at 255.
272Id.

23 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 924 & n.42.
211 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS, supra note

72, at 9, 12, 15.
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and that "[n]o Consideration, or an insufficient Consideration"
was a good ground for a motion in arrest of judgment or a writ of
error. 2 5 The point was partly substantive. It had been established
since the sixteenth century that it was essential to aver consideration in a declaration, and that the consideration had to be sufficient.2

This meant that, with some exceptions, a declaration con-

taining no averment was defective and that the consideration had
to be legally acceptable-for example, natural love and affection
were insufficient. The point was also partly procedural. Objection
could be taken to the absence of an appropriate averment by a
motion in arrest of judgment or by writ of error, because the defect
caused by absence or insufficiency of consideration in a declaration
was not cured by the verdict if it had not been raised at an earlier
stage in the proceedings. This has nothing to do with any doctrine
about adequacy. Indeed, in the paragraph following that from which
Horwitz quotes, Adams noted the well-established doctrine that a
court will not inquire into adequacy.277 All in all, the evidence in
favor of a substantive doctrine of consideration in the eighteenth
century is very weak.
E. The Sound-Price Doctrine
The "sound-price doctrine" must be distinguished from the
"substantive doctrine of consideration." The question whether a
"sound price" gave rise to an implied warranty of quality is quite
different from the question whether an "unsound" price allowed the
party who was the victim of a sharp deal to mitigate damages or to
get out of the bargain altogether.2 8 Evidence of the existence of 27a
"substantive doctrine of consideration" is, as I have tried to show, 1
almost completely lacking. There is more evidence of the existence
of a sound-price doctrine before about 1790, but it is meager, it
2
21

Id. at 9.
See A. SIMPSON, supra note 42, at 406-12, 434-37, 449-52.

21 "If the Consideration, on which a Promise is made, be a Benefit to the Defendant or
any Trouble or Prejudice to the Plaintiff, it is sufficient." 1 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS,
supra note 72, at 9. Horwitz, supra note 1, at 935, also points to Adams's argument in Tyler
v. Richards, Quincy 195, 195-96 (Mass. 1765) that indebitatus assumpsit should lie for boarding and schooling because "[tlhe Price for Boarding and Schooling is as much settled in the
Country, as it is in the Town for a Yard of Cloth, or a day's Work by a Carpenter." Horwitz
calls this a "remnant of the medieval just price theory of value," reflecting "an economic
system often based on customary prices." Horwitz, supra note 1, at 935. The issue in the case
was whether indebitatus assumpsit would lie; Adams lost the case, took the opposite tack
the following year in Pynchon v. Brewster, Quincy 224 (Mass. 1766), and lost again.
118See text at notes 238-240 supra.
21

See pp. 573-80 supra.
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comes almost entirely from writers of treatises, not from case law,
and it does not allow us to say very much about the nature, scope,
or history of the doctrine in the eighteenth century.
Horwitz's evidence20 for the sound-price doctrine in eighteenthcentury England is drawn partly from Wooddeson's lectures,28
partly from an unpublished treatise on contracts from about 1720,282
and partly from remarks of Grose, J., in Parkinsonv. Lee 28 (1802),
The passage that Horwitz partially quotes 2 4 from Gilbert's unpublished treatise 215 (circa 1720) is not easy to interpret, but it certainly
has nothing to do with any implication of a warranty from the price
paid, nor is it concerned with warranties at all. Gilbert is discussing
the relationship between what may be given in evidence to the jury
and what must be expressly alleged in the declaration, and in this
context he notes two anonymous and otherwise unpublished decisions at the Trinity Assizes at Maidstone in 1700.285 He cites the first
for the standard principle that it is no use to establish a good contract in evidence when it is different in substance from what was
alleged in the declaration. 287 The second case, which refines this
principle, reads:
But if a man Assumed to pay so much money for Hops, if
delivered well pickt dryed & bagg'd this is good evidence on a
Generall Assumpsit because so they ought to be whether Contracted for or not for the party ought to make them Merchantable goods & see them well delivered without any Special pro20 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 926-27 & n.53.
21 2 R. WOODDESON, supra note 238, at 415. See text at note 238 supra.
21 "Of Contracts," supra note 240, at f. 94a.
2u 2 East. 314, 102 Eng. Rep. 389 (K.B. 1802). I know of only one other eighteenthcentury English reference to sound price, Powell, who says:
And, in some contracts, the intention of the parties, as to the nature of their assent, will
be inferred from circumstances; as from price, or the like. Thus if a man sell a horse for
a price, which it could not be worth, unless it were sound, the contract will be void, if it
turn out otherwise; for the purchaser would never have consented to give a sound price,
unless he were to have a sound horse.
1 J. POWELL, supra note 50, at 150. Powell supports this by a general reference to "the writers
on natural law" and by the example of a fraudulent sale of a female slave disguised in the
clothes of a man "and offered to be hired or sold in that character." Id. The example is
irrelevant, however, because Powell's argument is not that an unsound price is evidence of
fraud, but that price is evidence of the intention of the parties.
24 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 926 n.53.
211"Of Contracts," supra note 240, at f. 94a.
211I imagine, although I have not confirmed it, that Gilbert, who had been called to the
bar two years earlier, attended the assizes and noted the cases himself.
I "Of Contracts," supra note 240, at f. 93b-94a.
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vision in the Contract tho' there were no more than a generall
Sale of the Commodity.2 88
The case holds that the plaintiff may give in evidence the agreement
that the hops were to be delivered well picked, dried, and bagged,
although this had not been expressly alleged in the declaration. The
reason given for this ruling, which was only at nisi prius, does appear to recognize a general obligation on a seller to deliver merchantable goods, but it does not relate this obligation to the price
paid. Gilbert does not elsewhere instance any other specific application of the admittedly wide principle stated.
Nor does the case law provide convincing evidence. In
Parkinson v. Lee"' (1802), Grose, J., stated that before Stuart v.
Wilkins"'0 (1778) a sound price given was "tantamount to a warranty
of soundness" of the goods, but that in Stuart Lord Mansfield had
rejected the sound price doctrine. 21 Lord Mansfield's opinion, however, did not actually state that there was such a doctrine and that
he was rejecting it, so it cannot be evidence for the acceptance of
the sound-price doctrine by the courts before 1778. On the other
hand, Lord Mansfield did not reject sound-price notions quite as
thoroughly as Grose indicated, so Stuart v. Wilkins itself may stand
as evidence for the acceptance by English courts, at least late in the
eighteenth century, of a mild variant of the sound-price doctrine.
Lord Mansfield said that "[s]elling for a sound price without
warranty may be a ground for an assumpsit, but, in such a case, it
'' 22
ought to be laid that the defendant knew of the unsoundness.
This intermediate view would cover liability for mere failure to disclose a known defect even when there is no misrepresentation or
active concealment.
From these meager references it is impossible to form a clear
idea of the sound-price doctrine or of its role in eighteenth-century
English courts. There is no clear indication that any English court
of law ever formally accepted it. The references may mean that
some judges did invite juries to find a warranty, or to find that there
was no consent, when a sound price was given or agreed upon and
the goods were defective. "Sound price," then, appears to be not so
much a legal doctrine as an expression used by some judges in
Id. at f. 94a.
21 2 East. 314, 102 Eng. Rep. 389 (K.B. 1802).
21 1 Dougl. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K,B. 1778).
21 2 East. at 322, 102 Eng. Rep. at 392.
2121 Dougl. at 20, 99 Eng. Rep. at 16.
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directing juries. 2 3 The references do not allow us to say much about
the scope of the doctrine-that is, what it is judges really told juries.
Since an express warranty of quality normally covered all defects,
whether or not the seller knew of them, perhaps the same was true
if a warranty was implied, but this is surmise. It is not at all clear
in what transactions such warranties might be implied, whether a
sound price was supposed to protect against patent defects as well
as latent ones, or what the relationship was between the view that
a sound price implied some sort of warranty of quality and the quite
different theory-though it reaches a similar result in many situations-that failure to disclose known latent defects constitutes fraud
or, at least, evidence of fraud.
In Mellish v. Motteux294 (1792), Lord Kenyon proceeded on the
basis that there was a duty of disclosure in a case involving the sale
of an unseaworthy ship, with defective futtocks (frame timbers). Parkinsonv. Lee"9 5 (1802), which held that there was no implied warranty of merchantable quality in a sale of hops by sample
at a fair market price, is not inconsistent with Mellish v. Motteux,
for it was a case in which the seller had no knowledge of the defect
in the hops. Thus, even after Parkinsonv. Lee there was a possibility that English common law would recognize a duty of disclosure
of known defects by the roundabout mechanism of treating nondisclosure as fraud.
In America, the early history of the sound-price doctrine is very
difficult to trace. Only two cases earlier than 1790 seem to be at all
relevant. In Waddill v. Chamberlayne2 11 (Virginia 1735), an action
on the case in the nature of an action of deceit was brought on the
sale of a slave. It was alleged that the seller, who received a high
price, knew that the slave was suffering from an incurable disease
and was worthless. The plaintiff secured a verdict, but we have in
the report an elaborate motion that the reporter himself had introduced to arrest judgment on the ground that no express warranty
was alleged or proved. The court rejected this argument, which
referred extensively to English authority and to the merits of caveat
emptor. But since no reasons for the court's decision were recorded,
it is quite impossible to tell whether the sound-price idea lay behind
2 Blackstone, for example, said that only warranties of good title, not warranties of
soundness, are implied by law. 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *451. Horwitz admits this.
Horwitz, supra note 1, at 926 n.53.
21 Peake 115, 170 Eng. Rep. 113 (1792) (nisi prius).
21 2 East. 314, 102 Eng. Rep. 389 (K.B. 1802).
3' Reported in 2 VIRGINIA COLONIAL DECISIONS B45 (R. Barton ed. 1909).
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it or whether the court applied the principle that a failure to disclose
a known defect was fraudulent. The other early case, Baker v.
Frobisher97 (Massachusetts 1762), also rejected caveat emptor, but
apparently on a quite different theory. It held that there was an
obligation to see that goods sold, in this case soap, were merchantable. The laconic report does not relate this obligation to the
price paid for the goods.
The earliest American cases holding clearly that a sound price
gives rise to an implied warranty against all faults were influenced
by the treatises. In Timrod v. Shoolbred211 (1793), a South Carolina
case, the source is Powell.2 9 In State v. Gaillard31° (1793), another
South Carolina case, the court said that the doctrine was borrowed
from civil law, and it referred extensively to Jean Domat, the
seventeenth-century French civil lawyer.3 Although the court said
that the doctrine had "become a part of the common law of this
country, '32 it did not cite a single case. 3 In a North Carolina decision in 1799, Toris v. Long,1 4 the source, as attributed by plaintiff's
counsel, is Wooddeson's Lectures.15 It would thus appear that although the Virginia and Massachusetts decisions earlier in the
eighteenth century evidencesome disposition to reject caveat emptor, the sound-price doctrine, if we mean by that the implication of
a warranty against all defects from a sound (that is, market) price,
is a creature of the late eighteenth century. And there is some reason
to believe it was derived from those same English sources, Powell
and Wooddeson, that tenuously evidence its existence in England,
although there was some disposition to treat the doctrine as a civillaw importation.3 °
"I Quincy 4 (Mass. 1762).

1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 324, 326 (1793), discussed in text at notes 416-418 infra.
1 J. POWELL, supra note 50, at 150.
2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 11 (1793).
' Id. at 17, 18, 19.
32 Id. at 17.
Furthermore the court did not rest its decision on a warranty implied from the price.
The plat that the seller produced at the sale of the land in issue represented the property as
having a good stream on it, which the purchasers needed. The court called this "fraud or
misrepresentation," even though the Commissioners apparently did not know about the error.
Id. at 18-19.
-1 1 N.C. (Tay.) 17 (1799).
'0 Id. at 18.
I" Other evidence cited in Horwitz, supra note 1, at 926 n.52: Rench v. Hile, 4 Har. &
McH. 495 (Md. 1766) (dealing with express warranties); Mackie's Ex'r v. Davis, 2 Va. (2
Wash.) 219 (1796) (dealing with a warranty of title, not quality), 1 Z. SwifT, supra note 74,
at 384 (although Swift cites no authority on this point, his source was probably Powell).
21

29
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Almost as soon as the sound-price doctrine was expressed, it
came under attack. In English law, caveat emptor had a long history, and it is apparent from counsel's vigorous argument in Waddill
v. Chamberlayne317 (1735) that there was always a school of thought
that favored it in eighteenth-century America. As Horwitz points
out,38 in Seixas v. Woods 3 9 (1804), the New York Supreme Court
rejected the sound-price doctrine in a 2-1 decision, relying on English authorities.3 10 Other jurisdictions soon followed: Horwitz cites
cases from the period 1816-26 in Connecticut, Massachusetts, Virginia, and Pennsylvania.3 11 The sound-price doctrine survived only
31 2
in the Carolinas.
Abandoning the sound-price doctrine, however, did not mean
adopting caveat emptor in all its rigors. With the exception of the
Carolinas, the courts did not imply a general warranty against defects from the soundness of price, but under the will theory of contracts they developed a body of law on implied warranties and the
effect of sales by description that very considerably reduced the
significance of the doctrine of caveat emptor. Although the subject
is too complex to explore here, Horwitz conveys an unbalanced picture by presenting the history of the law of sales in the early nineteenth century as predominantly concerned to adopt caveat emptor
and by neglecting the whole development of implied terms protective of the buyer. 13
317Reported in 2 VIRGINIA COLONIAL DE cSIONS, supranote 296, at B45. See text at note
296 supra.
'1 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 945.
3" 2 Cai. R. 48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
3I Horwitz, supra note 1, at 945, portrays the decisions as "relying on a doubtfully
reported seventeenth century English case" (Chandelor v. Lopus, Cro. Jac. 4, 79 Eng. Rep. 3
(Exch. Ch. 1603)). In fact, this case was only one of five relied on by Thompson, J.; he also
cited 1 & 2 J. FONBLANQuE, TREATISE OF EQurrY (1st ed. London 1793-94) in support. Seixas
v. Wood, 2 Cai. R. at 52-54. Kent, J., cited numerous cases, including Parkinson v. Lee, 2
East. 314, 102 Eng. Rep. 389 (K.B. 1802), the report of which had presumably just reached
New York; he said he would prefer the civil-law rule, "if the question was res integra in our
law." Id. at 55. Kent understood the common-law rule as requiring the vendor to disclose only
defects known to him and which the purchaser could not be expected to learn through
observation and inquiry. Id. at 54-56.
3" Horwitz, supra note 1, at 945 n.151. But see 2 J. KEN'r, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN
LAW 479 (2d ed. New York 1832) (1st ed. New York 1827) (suggesting that his own opinion in
Seixas was wrong on its facts); W. STORY, supra note 58,
831-839, at 710-18 (ignoring Seixas
in his discussion of the state this body of law had reached by 1847); The Doctrineof Implied
Warranty on the Sale of Personal Chattels, 12 AM. Jum. 311, 326 (1834) ("the case of Seixas
v. Woods, we believe, is now generally in practice disregarded").
311W. STORY, supra note 95, § 832, at 710-11 & 711 n.2.
311For a useful essay on the subject, see The Doctrine of Implied Warranty on the Sale
of Personal Chattels, supra note 311.
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Joinder of Express and Implied Contracts

Horwitz associates his older, equitable conception of contract
with the rule of pleading that permitted the joinder of counts on
express and implied contracts, and the victory of the will theory of
contract in the nineteenth century with the disappearance of this
rule. 314 In the eighteenth, century, for example, in an action of indebitatus assumpsit for the price of goods sold and delivered, the
liability was based on an express contract between the parties,
whereas in the action for money had and received, the liability
might be imposed by law in the absence of any agreement by the
defendant. For Horwitz, these two actions reflected "very different
conceptions of contract. . . .One was based on an express bargain
between the parties; the other derived contractual obligation from
'natural justice and equity.' ",315 Eighteenth-century lawyers, however, did not "perceive any latent theoretical contradictions involved in joining counts on express and implied contract. ' 31 6 As a
result, "the equitable tradition in the common counts"3 17 remained
alive. It is not quite clear what Horwitz means by this phrase, but
presumably he is implying that the joinder of counts allowed juries
to decide in terms of equitable notions inherent in enforcing implied
contracts even when there was an express agreement between the
parties.
This practice supposedly changed with the collapse of the old
conception of contract. "In the nineteenth century the practice of
joining counts on express and implied contracts began to be viewed
as contradictory, and the rule was ultimately laid down that the
existence of an express agreement precludes recovery in quantum
meruit. ' ' 31' Horwitz supports this by a reference 31 1 to Story's treatise
on contracts in which Story maintains that "[t]he general rule is,
that a contract will be implied only where there is no express contract, 'expressum facit cessare taciturn.' "320
Horwitz's account is confused in a number of ways. It is true,
of course, that forms of assumpsit were used to enforce different
kinds of agreements: express agreements, agreements that were
implied only in the sense that they were inferred from conduct, and
'" Horwitz, supra note 1, at 934-35, 952.
315 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 934.
316

Id.

3,1Id. at 935.
"' Id. at 934 n.87.

31,Horwitz, supra note 1, at 952.
321W. STORY, supra note 50,
15, at 8 (footnote omitted).
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agreements that were implied in the more radical sense of being
imposed by law, irrespective of actual agreement between the parties. It is also true that as a consequence there was a considerable
degree of analytical confusion of categories from the seventeenth
century onward. 2 ' But it is mistaken to say that it ever became the
rule that counts on express and implied contracts could not be
joined. Chitty states the rule in his day to be that "[i]n actions in
form ex contractu, the plaintiff may join as many different counts
as he has causes of action in assumpsit.'3 22 Chitty notes that while
it remained usual to add a quantum meruit or valebant count to an
indebitatus count, that practice had become unnecessary.32 3 The
plaintiff could recover "under an indebitatus count. . . what may
be due to him, although no specific price or sum was agreed
upon."324 Since the indebitatus count could now be used where only
a quantum meruit or quantum valebant count could work before,
the latter counts had become "in no case necessary. ' 32' Eventually,
these counts passed out of use, and quantum meruit survived as a
32
substantive doctrine, not as a form of pleading.
That it was long a common practice to join counts does not
mean that a contract would be implied when there was an express
contract. The available evidence indicates that a plaintiff used to
set forth different counts in the same declaration not to inflate the
agreed price by declaring on quantum meruit, but to have something to fall back on "lest he should fail in the proof ' '327 of his
assumpsit. What Story was expounding in the passage quoted by
Horwitz 321 was not a pleading rule, but a substantive doctrine that
was not new. It had never been suggested that claims to a quantum
32

See A. SIMPSON, supra note 42, at 489-505 and the authorities cited therein.

Carrry, A TREATISE ON THE PARTIES TO ACTIONS, TiE FORMS OF ACTION, AND ON
200 (4th ed. Philadelphia 1825) (1st ed. London 1809). In addition, it was "usual,
particularly in assumpsit, debt on simple contract, and action on the case, to set forth the
plaintiff's cause of action in various shapes in different counts." Id. at 392-93 (footnotes
omitted). See also 1 W. TIDD, supra note 89, at 10-12.
22 1 J. CHrrrY, supra note 322, at 394 (footnotes omitted).
= Id. at 337. See Pynchon v. Brewster, Quincy 224 (Mass. 1766), discussed in text at
notes 262-267 supra.
= 1 J. CHrrrY, supra note 322, at 337.
2 A later edition, 1 J. CtrY, A TREATISE ON THE PARTmS TO ACTIONS, AND ON PLEADING
342 (8th ed. Springfield, Mass. 1840) states that the pleading rules of Trinity Term, 1 Will.
IV virtually abolished the quantum meruit and valebant counts. See also id. at 414-18 for
222

1 J.

PLEADING

the rules adopted at Hillary Term, 4 Will. IV. For the early history of this development, see
A. SIMPSON, supra note 42, at 498-99.
"2

3 W.

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES

W. STORY, supra note 58,
note 1, at 952 & n.191.
2U

*295. See also text at note 335 infra.

15, at 8, quoted in text at note 296 supra; Horwitz, supra
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meruit-and it is with these that Horwitz is especially concerned-could be used to bypass the agreed price if there was one;
insofar as Story's principle involves no more than that, it involves
nothing novel.
In the nineteenth century there did develop a considerable body
of relevant case law grouped around two doctrines. The first was the
old doctrine that an entire contract could not be apportioned.32 9
Thus, if A agreed to perform a piece of work for B, and performance
was not completed, A could not recover on a pro ratabasis, and this
rule applied quite irrespective of why the entire contract had not
been performed. The leading case here for the nineteenth century
is Cutter v. Powell33o (1795). The other doctrine, which is also found
in that case, produces much the same result, but it is quite differently formulated: "Wherever there is an express contract the parties
must be guided by it; and one party cannot relinquish or abide by
it as it may suit his advantage." 331 Story's formulation "that a contract will be implied only when there is no express contract" 332 is a
version of this second way of looking at the matter. Story does,
however, later discuss the doctrine of entire contracts, 333 noting its
effect on the right to recover on a quantum meruit.
Whether the evolution of the law on this subject is viewed as a
transformation of the older law depends upon whether there had
been a time when entire contracts were apportioned, allowing pro
ratarecovery on partly performed contracts, or when plaintiffs could
inflate the agreed price by declaring on a quantum meruit. There
is no evidence that these things had ever generally been so. Indeed,
it is curious that although the ancient entire-contract doctrine was
relied on in Cutter v. Powell,33' the court there also treated as quite
settled that express contracts exclude implied ones: "That where
the parties have come to an express contract none can be implied
'335
has prevailed so long as to be reduced to an axiom in the law.
So it was put by Lord Kenyon in 1795, and Horwitz has provided
no evidence to refute it.
32,On the early history of this doctrine, see A. SIMPsON, supra note 42, at 69-70, 153, 528.

6 T.R. 320, 101 Eng. Rep. 573 (K.B. 1795).
Id. at 324, 101 Eng. Rep. at 576 (Ashhurst, J.).
232 W. STORY, supra note 58,
15, at 8-9. Story's formulation is, as Horwitz points out,
an expression of the will theory of contract. Horwitz, supra note 1, at 952.
3m W. STORY, supra note 58,
21-25, at 12-17.
'" 6 T.R. 320, 101 Eng. Rep. 573 (K.B. 1795).
"3 Id.
at 324, 101 Eng. Rep at 576.
"o

331
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HI.

THE TEXT WRITERS

To Horwitz, English and American text writers of the late
eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth centuries have a special
significance: they are the denouncers of older and better ways of
thinking about contract law. Horwitz's opening shots are directed
against the ghost of John Joseph Powell: "Beginning with the first
English treatise on contract, Powell's Essay Upon the Law of Contracts and Agreements (1790), a major feature of contract
writing has been its denunciation of equitable conceptions of substantive justice as undermining the 'rule of law.' ",336 Horwitz presents Powell as having been in the forefront of a new movement that
adopted the will theory of contract and argued, among other new
doctrines, that courts of equity should not be permitted to refuse to
3 37
enforce contracts for exorbitancy of price.
Horwitz reads the text writers to support his thesis in significant ways. He uses them to provide evidence for the existence of

some of the equitable doctrines that he believes dominated
eighteenth-century courts and also for the sharp reaction against
equitable conceptions that he believes took place around the turn
of the century. In my view, Horwitz is wrong on both counts.
In the first place, Horwitz overlooks that many of the most
influential doctrines in the texts of the time were drawn from older,
Continental writers. I have argued elsewhere that in the nineteenth
century contractual ideas from the civilian and natural lawyers
passed into English law through text writers.338 If the argument is
correct for English law, it is also correct for American law. During
the critical period for Horwitz, American lawyers made extensive
use of imported or specially printed editions of English law books;
they also relied on English decisions to supplement the very limited
indigenous materials. The first major American treatise on contract,
William Story's, was published in 1844, over half a century after the
English treatise by Powell. 39 Before Story there was little-an unfinished series of ten articles by Theron Metcalf published in the
American Jurist between 1838 and 1840340 and some coverage in
m3Horwitz, supra note 1, at 917 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 917-18.
Simpson, supra note 60.
'' W. STORY, supra note 58.
340 Metcalf, Law of Contracts, 20 AM. JuR. 1, 249 (1838-39), 21 id. at 1, 258 (1839); 22 id.
at 1, 249 (1839-40); 23 id. at 257 (1840); 24 id. at 1, 257 (1840-41). These articles were based
on lectures first delivered in 1828. They formed the basis of his important treatise, T. METcALF, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CoNTrsArS (New York 1867). See Horwitz, supra note 1, at
951 n.184.
33
33
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Chancellor Kent's Commentaries341 (1826-28) were the most important. Before there were American texts, lawyers necessarily used
sources, and thus law, that came from abroad.
The older Continental literature was available to Americans
directly too, not only through the medium of English texts and
decisions. Some of the more scholarly lawyers in a scholarly period
of legal development could read Continental authors in the original.
For the others, there was a steady stream of translations. Pothier,
who died in 1772, was especially important. His Trait des
obligations (1761-64) was published in America in two different
translations in at least five editions between 1802 and 1853.342 This
was a work based on much older sources; insofar as it contained
modern law, it was old law worked up into a form appropriate for
mid-eighteenth-century France. English translations were also
available of Grotius's De Jure Belli ac Pacis (Paris 1625), 313 Pufendorf's De Jure Naturae et Gentium (London 1672),' 31 Domat's Les
lois civiles dans leur ordre naturel (Paris 1689),' 31 and even such a

relatively minor work as Heineccius, Elementa Juris Naturae et
Gentium, published at Halle in 1738, was translated into English
only three years later.3 48 Still more Americans would have learned

about the Continental tradition through the works of theological
writers such as Rutherford 347 and Paley.341 And there was widespread
knowledge of the French Code Civil.
It is not the purpose of this article to discuss the complicated
problem of why nineteenth-century England and America were receptive to these older, Continental legal doctrines. The adaptability

"I

Principally in 2 J. KENT, supra note 311, Lecture 39, "Of the Contract of Sale," at
363-436 in the first edition and at 449-558 in the second.
312R. PoTHIER, A TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS CONSIDERED IN A MORAL AND LEGAL VIEW (F.
Martin trans. Newburn, N.C. 1802). There were American editions of W. Evans's translation, entitled A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLGATIONS OR CONTRACrs (st ed. London 1806),
in 1826, 1839, and 1853. Several of Pothier's other works also appeared in translation in
America. For a nineteenth-century American view of Pothier, see Life and Writings of
Pothier, 12 AM. JUR. 341 (1834).
33H. GROTIUS, ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE (English translations appeared in 1654,
1655, 1682, 1738, and 1814).
311 S. PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS (English translations appeared in

1703, 1710, 1729, and 1749 and an abridged version appeared in 1716).
315J. DOMAT, supra note 29 (English editions appeared in 1722 and 1737).
311 J. HEINECCIUS, METHODICAL SYSTEM OF UNIVERSAL LAW (G. Turnbull trans. 1741). See

the praise of Heineccius in Life and Writings of Pothier, supra note 342, at 343-44.
31 E.g., 1 & 2 T. RUTHERFORD, INSTITUTES OF NATURAL LAW (1754-56).
"I E.g., W. PALEY, MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1784). This work was enormously

popular; fifteen editions appeared in Paley's lifetime (d. 1805).
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of these doctrines to the needs of an industrializing society is no
doubt part of the answer. But there is an obvious difficulty in understanding the ideas of the text writers, so many of which were borrowed from an older literature, simply in terms of nineteenthcentury English or American industrial capitalism. If, for example,
350
349
the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) is, as it has been argued,
peculiarly appropriate to mid-nineteenth-century industrial capitalism, what was it doing in Orleans in the 1760's? 3 5 ' But such questions do not appear in Horwitz's work on contracts.
The narrower question is whether the authors Horwitz cites
mark a sharp break with eighteenth-century equitable ideas. Powell, we are told, stated that equity "'must be arbitrary and uncertain"' 35 2 because he believed "that there could be no principles of
substantive justice. ' 35 3 Horwitz supports this statement with two
quotations, wrenched from their contexts and 670 pages apart in
Powell. 35 ' Furthermore, he reproduces the first of these passages
with two highly significant omissions, which I restore here in italics:
It is absolutely necessary for the advantage of the public at
large, that the rights of the subject should, when agitatedin a
court of law, depend upon certain and fixed principles of law,
and not upon rules and constructions of equity, which when
applied there, must be arbitrary and uncertain, depending, in
the extent of their application, upon the will and caprice of the
355
judge.
A look at the context, and at the words Horwitz omits, shows that
Powell is not attacking equity in this passage, but is doing something entirely different, defending the separation of law and equity.
Two pages before the passage just quoted, Powell writes that he does
not object "to such temporary modifications of the law, as must and
ought to be made to fit it to the exigencies of civil society. 3 5 It is
therefore good that courts of equity can adapt remedies. But "the
rights of the subject should, when agitatedin a court of law, depend
upon certain and fixed principles of law" because, when applied in
9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
- Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrializationof Law, 4 J. LEGAL
STuD. 249 (1975).
311 R. POTMER, TRAITE DES OBLIGATIONS, pt. 1, ch. 2, art. 3, §§ 159-172, at 139-58,
especially § 169, at 153-54 (nouv. ed. Paris 1777) (1st ed. Paris 1761).
,x3 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 918 (quoting 1 J. POWELL, supra note 50, at x).
m Horwitz, supra note 1, at 918.
3'

3"

See text and notes at notes 355, 359 infra.

M"I J. POWELL, supra note 50, at x; Horwitz, supra note 1, at 917-18.
3" 1 J. POWELL, supra note 50, at viii.
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a court of law, the "rules
and constructions of equity must be arbi357
trary and uncertain.
Against this passage from Powell's introduction, Horwitz juxtaposes one from the second volume. I quote Horwitz quoting Powell:
A court of equity, for example, should not be permitted to
refuse to enforce an agreement for simple "exorbitancy of
price" because "it is the consent of parties alone, that fixes the
just price of any thing, without reference to the nature of things
themselves, or to their intrinsic value . . . . [T]herefore," -he
concluded, "a man is obliged in conscience to perform a contract which he has entered into, although it be a hard one
....." The entire conceptual apparatus of modern contract
doctrine . . . arose to express this will theory of contract.5
In reality, in this passage Powell is neither innovating nor advocating a modern will theory. He is reporting359 and explaining Keen v.
Stuckey3" ° (1721), where, some seventy years earlier, the significance of exorbitancy of price had been raised but not decided. The
extract quoted by Horwitz attempts to explain why "exorbitancy
of price, uncoupled with circumstances of fraud, has not yet been
determined to be a ground, -for the court of Chancery to refuse its
interposition on behalf of the vendor of an estate. '361 Powell's ex" Id. at x, reproduced in full in text at note 355 supra.
m Horwitz, supranote 1, at 918 (quoting 2 J. POW.LL, supra note 50, at 229). The passage
is presented by Horwitz as if Powell were there giving a reason for his alleged belief that there
are no principles of substantive justice, which in the context he was not.
"I I am aware that the line between "reporting" arid "advocating" is often not very clear.
Here, however, Po~vqll's explanation of why even equity had not refused, on 'grounds. of
exorbitancy of price alone, to enforce contracts for the sale of an estate is closely related to
arguments by counsel in the case. If such reporting is taken to mean that Powell was sympathetic with the views reported, it should be pointed out that only eight pages earlier, -when
discussing the grounds upon which specific performance should be xefuged, he states this
remarkably wide principle:
Therefore, no rule is better established than, that every agreement, to merit the interposition of a court of equity in its favour, must be fair,just, reasonable, bonafide, certain,
in all its parts, mutual, useful, made upon a good or valuable consideration,not merely
voluntary, consistent with the general policy of It well-regllated society, and free from
fraud, circumvention or surprize; or at least such agreement, must, in its effect, ultimately tend to produce a just end.
2 J. POWELL, supra note 50, at 221 (emphasis in the original). See also note 186 supra.
"I Gilb. Rep. 155, 25 Eng. Rep. 109 (H.L. 1721). The decision is also reported under the
name Kien v. Stukeley, 1 Bro. 191, 1 Eng. Rep. 506 (H:L. 1722 [sic]).
3112 J. POWELL, supra note 50, at 228 (emphasis added, but later on the same page*Powell
repeats the clause and emphasizes the "yet": "But although exorbitancy of price has not yet
Id. at 228-29).
been held a ground to refuse the interposition of a court of equity .
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planation is very similar to what counsel had argued before the
court in 1721:
On the other Side, 'twas said, that a Man was obliged in Conscience to perform a Bargain, though it was a hard one; and
where he was obliged in Conscience, it was no Hardship upon
him to be compelled thereto; that nothing in the World was
more uhcertain than the Price of Land; for Land may be worth
40 Years Purchase to one Man, that was worth but 20 to an22
other. 1
Powell's personal view, which was more benign than Horwitz
reveals, is quite clearly expressed elsewhere:
And although inadequacy of price, considered abstractedly qua
such, is not a ground to invalidate a contract; yet there is a
great opinion (and which I trust will not be suffered to lye
dormant, when occasion offers to give effect to it) that, taken
in another light, and not merely in the view that the price is
inadequate, the circumstance of inadequacy alone can be made
a ground for setting aside a contract. I mean, in the light of
furnishing self-evident demonstration, -from the intrinsic nature and subject of the bargain itself, of fraud; evincing thht
the party who suffers the loss must have been imposed upon,'
and cannot be considered as having been in possession of an
understanding adequate to render him capable of contracting;
in which case no obligation could be incurred by him.' 3
This is not an isolated passage. Powell also favored a doctrine that
gave the purchaser of goods for a sound price a right to avoid the
contract if the goods were not sound. 84 And these positions are
consistent with his whole approach to contracts, which he explains
in his preface-his apologia. "Contracts comprehend the whole
Gilb. Rep. 155, 156, 25 Eng. Rep. 109, 109 (Ch. 1721).
2 J. Powm.L, supra note 50, at 157-58. See also id. at 78. Powell discusses inadequacy
of price in id. at 78 (Will equity refuse to enforce?), 152 (Will equity set aside?), 157-58
(Will equity set aside?). He discusses exorbitancy, id. at 228-29 (Will equity grant specific
performance?). I would not place much significance upon his reference to "inadequacy" in
one place and "exorbitancy" in another, or his discussing the setting aside of contracts only
for inadequacy, not for exorbitancy. To be charged an exorbitant price means that one is
receiving an inadequate consideration (if not, strictly speaking, an inadequate price). Thus,
Powell writes, "Inadequacy of price, abstractedfrom all other considerations,seems of itself
to furnish no ground on which a court can set aside, or rather relieve a party to a contract
. But if the cause of the inequality of price be founded in circumstances" from which
the court might conclude that consent was not free, or was conditional, the contract might
be set aside. Id. at 152 (emphasis in the original). Here, at least, Powell treats "inadequacy
of price" and "inequality of price" as synonymous.
31 1 id. at 150, discussed in text at note 283 supra.
'

"

The University of Chicago Law Review

[46:533

business of human negotiations."3 " In spite of the different objects
of contracts, however, "the contracts respecting them must uniformly be determined by the principles of natural or civil equity."3 "'
So Powell's aim was to analyze the authorities and thereby to
"discover the general rules and principles of natural and civil equity
on which those decisions are founded."3 7 These are hardly the sentiments of the Powell whom Horwitz presents as denying the existence of principles of substantive justice and as claiming that equity
must be arbitrary and uncertain.
What Powell is said to have begun, Joseph Story is said to have
completed. Horwitz presents Story's Equity Jurisprudence,18published in 1835-36, as the final step in the process that brought about
the denunciation of "equitable conceptions of substantive justice as
undermining the 'rule of law.' "369

In Story, Horwitz writes,

"American law finally yielded up the ancient notion that the substantive value of an exchange could provide an appropriate measure
of the justice of a transaction.""37 But Story is an unfortunate choice,
for in fact he states as law in 1836 what Powell, far from attacking,
had hoped would become law. 3

1

Story acknowledges that

"[ilnadequacy of consideration is not then, of itself, a distinct
principle of relief in Equity. ' 372 He goes on to say, however, that
"there may be such an unconscionableness or inadequacy in a bargain, as to demonstrate some gross imposition or undue influence;
and in such cases Courts of Equity ought to interfere, upon the
satisfactory ground of fraud."37 3 The same doctrine is, incidentally,
ml 1 J. PoWELL, supra note 50, at iii.
386Id.

37
36

Id. at iv.
1 & 2 J. STORY,

COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND

AND AMERICA (Boston 1835-36).
31 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 917, 950-51. None of the writers mentioned talks about "the
rule of law;" the expression is Horwitz's.
370Id. at 950. The precise meaning of "ancient notion" is somewhat obscure, as is its
supposed antiquity; no proposition phrased in a remotely similar manner is, so far as I am
aware, to be found in any law report or text in the history of English law. It can only be
understood as referring to some doctrine regarding inadequacy of price as vitiating contracts.
"I See text at note 363 supra.
312 1 J. STORY, supra note 368,
245, at 249.
33Id. 246, at 250 (footnote omitted). Story continues:
But then such unconscionableness or such inadequacy should be made out, as would,
to use an expressive phrase, shock the conscience, and amount in itself to conclusive and
decisive evidence of fraud. And where there are other ingredients in the case of a suspicious nature, or peculiar relations between the parties, gross inadequacy of price must
necessarily furnish the most vehement presumption of fraud.
244-250, at 248-54. The "expressive phrase" is
Id. (footnotes omitted). See generally id.
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stated in England by Chitty in 1826311 in a slightly weaker form;
3 5
William Story follows JosephY.
Later in the century, in 1858, Fry's
37 has
classic A Treatise on the Specific Performance of Contracts
37
essentially the same doctrine in a slightly stronger form. Nothing
dramatic seems to have occurred.
Between Powell and Joseph Story, Horwitz relies primarily on
three writers, Daniel Chipman,379 Nathan Dane, 380 and Gulian Verplanck.3 1' So far as Chipman is concerned, the passages cited3 2 have
a peculiar context that is not in the least concerned with the invalidity or modification of contracts on the ground of unfairness of price.
Chipman nowhere discusses this topic in his strange book. The book
is wholly concerned with legal problems arising in an agricultural
economy in which, although trade is conducted by reference to
prices expressed in the normal way in money terms, because of the
lack of specie debts are commonly settled by converting the price
into the form of goods.23
from Eldon in Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Ves. Jun. 234, 246, 32 Eng. Rep. 592, 597 (Ch. 1804),
discussed in text at notes 204-205 supra. See also text at notes 177-180, 203-210 supra.
7'J. CHrrry, supra note 58, at 224.
"I W. STORY, supra note 58, 432, at 354-55, 483, at 402.
3' E. FRY, supra note 208.
3" Id. at 127-32.
37 One explanation for the repeated insistence that inadequacy as such does not invalidate a contract may be a reluctance to formulate a doctrine of equity in terms expressly
contradictory of an established and unquestioned common-law rule, that inadequacy of consideration is irrelevant.
"' D. CHIPMAN, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF CoNTRACTS, FOR THE PAYMENT OF SPECIFICK
ARTICLES (Middlebury 1822), discussed in Horwitz, supra note 1, at 947.
3" 1-9 N. DANE, A GENERAL ABRIDGEMENT AND DIGEST OF AMERIcAN LAW (Boston 1823-29),
discussed in Horwitz, supra note 1, at 947, 949-51.
381
G. VERPLANcK, supra note 44, discussed in Horwitz, supra note 1, at 946-49. Horwitz
also includes Metcalf, supra note 340, but if I understand his argument, it is merely that
Metcalf marginally belonged to the new movement because he was "beginning to pretend that
contractual obligation derives only from the will of the parties," Horwitz, supra note 1, at
952; predominantly he belonged to the old order. Id. at 951-52. No passage is cited to support
this claim; all we are given is a passage which shows quite clearly that Metcalf did not think
that all contractual obligations arose from the will of the parties. Id. at 952. This makes it
difficult to discuss the claim.
-11 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 947 (citing D. CHIPMAN, supra note 379, at 109-11). In a
footnote, Horwitz states that Chipman is the first American legal writer to use the notion that
tender can in appropriate circumstances be treated as equivalent to performance. Id. at 930
n.68. If this is taken to suggest that the idea was unknown or little known in American before
1822, it is incorrect; the idea is commonplace in the standard books available. Of course, since
Chipman's was the very first American book specifically on contract, though it is not a general
treatise on the subject, it can be said to contain the first discussion of tender in an American
text or treatise on contract.
. Horwitz states that Chipman was arguing that "[o]nly the market could establish a
fair basis for exchange," when he criticized a particular Vermont custom. Horwitz, supra note
1, at 947. This is most misleading. Chipman discusses a custom operating in Vermont, "to
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Horwitz also divorces Nathan Dane's views from their context
in an unhelpful way. The discussion of law and morality from which
Horwitz quotes is in fact taken from a section of Dane's
Abridgement39' that discusses the laws of Rome and the civilian
system in France: " the topic under discussion is the doctrine of
laesio enormis,3 9 according to which a sale of immovable property

could be set aside if the price was less than half the value. Dane's
discussion of inadequacy of price in American law is to be found
elsewhere.387 llorwitz states that Dane attacked "all conceptions of
a substantive theory of exchange." 88 One of the passages Horwitz
quotes in support381 indeed evinces great hostility to English decisions ("trash," "the productions of inferior lawyers"), but the point
Dane is making has absolutely nothing to do with inadequacy of
price or fair exchanges. He is talking about post-1776 English decisions on property, not contract: he actually commends eighteenthcentury equity as it existed in England before the American Revolution.

390

It is apparent that Verplanck's Essay on the Doctrine of
Contracts39 1 (1825) presents Horwitz with a problem. Verplanck's
have grain apprised, as well as cattle or horses, when tendered in payment of debts," not
at market price, but at "a certain common price considerably above the cash price." D.
CHiPMAN, supra note 379, at 109. 1 take this to refer to an understood equivalence between
money and grain, cattle or horses-for example, wheat might be treated on the books as worth
a dollar a bushel although when it did change hands for hard specie it was for less. The point
of this custom may have been to protect the farmer-debtor against a sharp decline in the price
of agricultural commodities when his debt was due. Chipman, however, interprets the custom
as an ineffective attempt to keep agricultural prices high, and he attacks it on various
grounds. When he says "let money be the sole standard in making all contracts," id. at 111,
quoted in Horwitz, supra note 1, at 947, he means by "money," in this context, real cash
prices, as opposed to notional prices that involve treating corn as a form of money and not
just a substitute for it. Chipman is not discussing whether, in general, only a competitive
market can establish a fair basis for exchange.
3" 1 N. DANE, supra note 380, at 100-01. Horwitz, supra note 1, at 949-50.
u" Dane there describes sections 3 to 27 as follows: "Thus far, 3 to 27, both included, is
extracted from the law of Rome and France." 1 N. DANE, supra note 380, at 101.
3" See text at notes 28-29 supra.
1171 N. DANE, supra note 380, at 89, 108-10, 661.
3" Horwitz, supra note 1, at 950.
Id. (quoting 1 N. DANE, supra note 380, at 107-08).
I" 1 N. DANE, supra note 380, at 107. Horwitz's use of this source is not improved by
his juxtaposing another passage from Dane, which is indeed about inadequacy of price, but
which occurs over 500 pages later, and which he quotes without any of the qualifications in
the original. Horwitz, supra note 1, at 950, n.177 (quoting 1 N. DANE, supra note 380, at 661).
Dane's point is in fact that inadequacy may be evidence of fraud. See text at notes 205-234
supra.
321G. VERPLANCK, supra note 44. On Verplanck, see R. JULY, THE EssFNrML N w YORKER:
JULAN CROMNM VF.RPLANCK (1951). At the time the book was written, Verplanck had no
reputation as a lawyer although much later, between 1838 and1841, he achieved great distinction when he became the dominant figure in the New York Court of Errors. Unhappily, he
never sat on a case that enabled him to consider judicially the views expressed in his Essay
on the law of sale.
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argument was provoked by the decision of the Supreme Court in
Laidlaw v. Organ3 2 (1817) and consists of a sustained attack on the
doctrine of caveat emptor 3 Unlike Horwitz, who seems to think
that caveat emptor was an innovation of the late eighteenth or early
nineteenth century, 394 Verplanck thought it was the ancient rule "of
Fitzherbert and Croke.""39 But this was to him no recommendation,
and he believed it should be extirpated from the law. 3 1 Verplanck's
hostility to caveat emptor would seem at first sight to place him on
the side of the angels. But he regarded the notion of inadequacy of
price as incoherent and argued that the law should not consider
39
inadequacy of price by itself as a ground for contractual invalidity. 1
Verplanck was trying to destroy the principle of caveat emptor
and lay the basis for a more moral law of sales without undermining
the market as a setter of price. He did this essentially by distinguishing between contracts for the sale of unique goods (such as a
racehorse or a Rembrandt, for which value depends only on the
subjective desires of the parties) 38 or speculative contracts (in which
everyone's cards are, so to speak, known to be hidden), and, on the
other hand, contracts for goods for which there is a going market
price.3 99 In the latter case, dealers "of ordinary prudence" take into
account those facts that affect the market price." ® Where the going
price is asked and paid, therefore, it may be presumed that both
parties implicitly made the existence of the "common facts" that
affect market price a condition of the contract"0 ' and that one party
does not have, or is not taking advantage of, superior knowledge
"1 15 U.S.

(2 Wheat.) 178 (1817). See G. VE1ULANCK, supra note 44, at 4-5.

*,3Verplanck called caveat emptor "an odious maxim" which should, "with all its trains
of absurdities and contradictions . . . be for ever expelled from our courts." G. VERPLANCK,

supra note 44, at 217.
3"

Horwitz, supra note 1, at 945.

3,"G. VERPLANCK, supra note 44, at 29. Verplanck thought that some inroads on the
doctrine had been made, beginning around 1750, with the evolution of a rule to the effect that
there was an implied warranty of quality when a fair price had been given (the sound-price
doctrine). Id. at 28-29, 29 n.* (citing 2 R. WOODDESON, supra note 238, at 415). He states that
"Professor Wooddeson does not cite any judicial decisions in aid of his own opinion, but it
seems to have been often so ruled at Nisi Prius, in his day." G. VERPLmCK, supra note 44, at
29 n.*. Verplanck thought that the new rule had then been rejected in a series of decisions
beginning with Stuart v. Wilkins, 1 Dougl. 18, 99 Eng. Rep. 15 (K.B. 1778), and that Parkinson v. Lee, 2 East. 314, 102 Eng. Rep. 389 (K.B. 1802) finally restored the rule "as it stood in

the days of Fitzherbert and Croke." See text at notes 289-295 supra.
3" G. VERPLANcK, supra note 44, at 217.
Id.
Id.
3" Id.
11 Id.
411Id.

",
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at
at
at
at

115-16, 225.
108-10, 113-15.
110-13, 115-16.
112.
112-13
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with respect to these facts.4 12 From this Verplanck derived a duty
of disclosure of all facts known to one party but not patent to the
other if these facts, were they generally known, would affect the
price of the good.0 3 The remaining problem concerned allocating
risk of latent defects (or of other facts that would affect the price
if generally known) about which both the seller and the buyer were
ignorant at the time of the contract. Although Verplanck saw this
as a difficult problem, ultimately, in the case of goods for which
there was an ordinary market and which were sold at the market
price, he thought the seller should be presumed to have assumed the
risk-though his presumption was rebuttable. Where both parties
were innocent, he believed consequential damages should lie where
they fall. 4 '
Verplanck does not fit into Horwitz's scheme. According to
Horwitz, "the importance of [the acceptance by late eighteenth- or
early nineteenth-century courts of] caveat emptor lies in its overthrow of both the sound price doctrine and the latter's underlying
conception of objective value."40 5 Verplanck, however, rejects not
only caveat emptor but (subject to important qualifications) the
sound-price doctrine and "the underlying conception of objective
value."'0 0 Instead of accepting that Verplanck's complex argument
does not enable the book to be categorized neatly into his analysis,
Horwitz falls back upon the notion of "deeper levels." Thus, he
argues that "at its deepest level, Verplanck's Essay marks the
triumph of a subjective theory of value in a market economy."' 0 To
support this interpretation, Horwitz is forced to present Verplanck
without many of the qualifications and conflicts in the Essay. Thus
we are told that Verplanck thought that "value is solely determined
by the clash of subjective desire."'0 8 Verplanck never makes this
claim, and it is strictly true only for his analysis of the price of
unique goods and perhaps of speculative contracts. His analysis of
the price of goods for which there is a regular market, as we have
seen, is more reminiscent of the communis aestimatio of Christian
moralists than of a subjectivist and individualist will theory of contract.'0 9
Id: at 120, 125-26.
' Id. at 125-26, 227-28.
"4

Id. at 141-52, 229.30.

1' Horwitz, supra note 1, at 946 n.15.
4" G. VERPLANCK, supra note 44, at 89-93 (rejecting the just price doctrine). See note 44
supra.
40 Horwitz, supra note 1, at 948.
"" Id. at 949 (citing G. VERPLANCK, supra note 44, at 225).
Compare text at notes 399-404, supra with text at notes 24-26 supra. The similarity
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Horwitz also distorts the argument of the Essay by giving no
account of Verplanck's "code" of proper commercial conduct ° and
by making the following disparaging remark: "Thus, while he refused in theory to separate law and morality, Verplanck confined
fraud to a range sufficiently narrow to permit the contract system
to reinforce existing social and economic inequalities."'" In truth,
had Verplanck's scheme been adopted, it would have-produced a
law of sale of dramatically higher morality than any to be found
earlier or later in the history of the common law.
Actually, Horwitz need not have been troubled by Verplanck
(or Chipman for that matter) for, fascinating and interesting though
the Essay is, there is no reason whatsoever to suppose that it had
any influence on the evolution of law in our period. At the time,
Verplanck had no reputation as a lawyer, and the Essay was received with hostility or indifference. 12 It would be more relevant to
consider the text writers whose books were bought and used, and if
this is done there is little evidence of the sustained denunciation of
any "equitable doctrine." In Chitty's 1826 treatise, for example, a
work of 346 pages, inadequacy of consideration receives one passage
of ten lines and another of thirteen, written in a style that is hardly
denunciatory.1 3 William Story (1847 edition) contains 1034 numbered paragraphs; inadequacy of consideration is mentioned in only
five, as best I can find. 414 The whole subject, though of some importance, did not appear to contemporaries to be of major importance.
The law on the subject was fairly well settled and rarely invoked.
between Verplanck and the Christian moralists should not be exaggerated. Verplanck attacks
the doctrine of the just price because it is based on the notion that every honest sale proceeds
on the assumption of an exchange of equivalents, whereas he stresses that both
parties agree to an exchange because they value what they received higher than what they
give. Id. at 90. The conception of contract that he criticizes here was standard form in the
Christian moralists and their successors.
, G. VERPLANCK, supra note 44, at 224-34.
" Horwitz, supra note 1, at 949.
112R. JuLY, supra note 391, at 209-11.
j. CHrrrY, supra note 58, at 224.
"' W. STORY, supra note 58,
431-432, at 352-55, 483, at 401-02, 502, at 419, and
778, at 671-72 (I have not seen any other edition). All these paragraphs deal with the possibility of setting aside contracts for inadequacy. Circumstances that allow a court to set aside a
contract would allow it to refuse specific performance, but the reverse is not necessarily the
case; Story never discusses inadequacy as a ground for refusing specific performance alone.
The problem of adequacy of consideration must be distinguished from other issues
involving consideration, such as its sufficiency, which Story discusses id. 427, at 349-50.
On the distinction between adequacy and sufficiency, see text at notes 275-277 supra.
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CONCLUSION

When Horwitz's general account of the dramatic transformation of contract law is broken down into specific propositions, and
these are then examined in detail and referred to the evidence, his
thesis is found to be oversimplified. Through an unsatisfactory and
loose use of evidence, he has made a complex, confused story fall
into a preordained pattern. What is still more fundamental, Horwitz
appears to me to have made two very dubious assumptions.
The first concerns the interpretation of the growth in scale and
elaboration of contract law in the nineteenth century. Essentially,
Horwitz views this as a change from one body of substantive law to
another, the earlier law favoring the commercial class less than the
new. Horwitz is aware, however, 1 5 that the development of contract
law considerably reduced the sovereignty of the jury, whose earlier
discretionary power came to be restricted by the newly elaborated
law and by the extension of control over the remaining area of discretion. To sustain his pessimistic interpretation, Horwitz is forced
into a romanticized view of the eighteenth-century jury, and into
attributing to it a consistent and morally appealing doctrinal position. This interpretation is not supported by evidence. Because he
believes that a change in substantive doctrine must have taken
place, Horwitz fails to grasp the nature of the historical problem:
what needs to be explained is this progressive dethronement of the
jury, which is accompanied by the generation or reception of law in
order not so much to replace or transform older doctrine as to
provide law where before there was little or none.
Horwitz's second assumption concerns the relationship between the doctrines he discusses and the exploitation of the poor
and weak. Nobody, of course, would doubt the existence of such
exploitation in this period, and there is nothing in any way implausible in the claim that certain legal doctrines may facilitate such
exploitation. Great care is required, however, in establishing natural
links between particular doctrines and human oppression. The
sound-price doctrine, for instance, admirable though it may be in
some contexts, is not so admirable in others. In the Carolinas, where
the doctrine flourished, it turns up in the context of sales of slaves.
In the case of Timrod v. Shoolbred '" (1793), assumpsit was brought
"for the value of a family of negroes sold at public auction, viz. a
fellow called Stepney, a ploughman, his wife, a young wench, their
4,1Horwitz, supra note 1, at 925-26.
41 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 324 (1793).
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daughter and her child, bid off at 170."417 The day after he was
purchased, Stepney broke out with smallpox, from which he died.
The purchaser refused to pay unless the price was reduced pro rata,
and the court agreed, applying the equitable doctrine.and reducing
the sale price. The court said: "In every contract every imaginable
fairness ought to be observed, especially in the sale of negroes, which
are a valuable species of property in this country."418
In England the implied warranty arose in the context of the sale
of horses. The poor did not buy horses; they walked. The doctrine
of laesio enormis in the civil law protected landowners; in England
the case law in chancery on sales at low value and on "catching
bargains" with expectant heirs appears to have largely performed
the same function. No doubt certain aspects of contract law pressed
on the poor-imprisonment for debt is surely the principal villain
here. But in the main, I doubt if their lot was much improved by
the existence of an implied warranty of quality on the sale of victuals, or made worse by some detail of the rules for the assessment
of damages. It was their misfortune to be outside the world in which
such luxuries as legal actions at common law or bills in equity much
mattered.
417

Id.

Id. at 325. Hence, the court continued, the implied warranty "of soundness of the
thing [sic] sold." Id. at 326.
'1,

